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INTRODUCTION 
WAKING, SEEING 
For a long time I would go to bed early. Sometimes, the candle 
barely out, my eyes closed so quickly that I did not have time to tell 
myself: “I’m falling asleep.” And half an hour later the thought that 
it was time to look for sleep would awaken me; I would make as if 
to put away the book which I imagined was still in my hands, and 
to blow out the light; I had gone on thinking, while I was asleep, 
about what I had just been reading, but these thoughts had taken a 
rather peculiar turn; it seemed to me that I myself was the 
immediate subject of my book: a church, a quartet, the rivalry 
between Francois I and Charles V. This impression would persist for 
some moments after I awoke; it did not offend my reason, but lay 
like scales upon my eyes and prevented them from registering the 
fact that the candle was no longer burning. Then it would begin to 
seem unintelligible, as the thoughts of a previous existence must be 
after reincarnation; the subject of my book would separate itself 
from me, leaving me free to apply myself to it or not; and at the 
same time my sight would return and I would be astonished to find 
myself in a state of darkness, pleasant and restful enough for my 
eyes, but even more, perhaps for my mind, to which it appeared 
incomprehensible, without a cause, something dark indeed.  1
 The Search begins as such, in a moment of darkness, of incomprehensibility, of a return 
to sight from something else—a dream, perhaps, or an otherwise imagined reality. The book is 
still, Marcel imagines, in his hands, the light still needing to be blown out; this reality is 
 Marcel Proust, Swann’s Way, trans. Charles Kenneth Scott-Moncrieff, Terence Kilmartin, and Dennis Joseph Enright, 1
Modern Library pbk. ed, In Search of Lost Time, v. 1 (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 1.
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convincing enough that, even though it is one that exists in a liminal space between the world 
and the imaginary, it is well-lit and epistemologically sustained by aspects of his perception. 
What most upsets a conception of the real in this moment is not that it is a moment that is 
perceptually inviable, but that the act of perception is not grounded in a normalcy of 
perception, of things within the perceptual world-space.  
 An alterity of perception, of seeing, a stumbling through the imaginary, places our 
narrator within a uniquely literary space, as if he were the “immediate subject of [his] book.” 
Waking up in his childhood home in Combray, Marcel experiences what is not exactly an act of 
unseeing, not quite a closing of the eyes. We cannot doubt that this is an episode that describes 
an act of seeing: the light, the book are still regarded in their proximity to the narrator. And still, 
there are seeings which appear to be less comprehensible: “a church, a quartet, the rivalry 
between Francois I and Charles V” are as present, further into the passage, as the ephemera of 
the room in the imaginary that directly surrounds him. These are the constituent parts of a 
perceptual whole that then supplants the seeing eye, of a perceptible imaginary that supplants 
the real: the church later becomes an image analogous both with the perception of duration, of 
time itself,  and with the process of literary creation;  the quartet alludes to the sense of hearing 2 3
as well as toward a lived experience in relation with art and art-making; the rivalry between 
Francois I and Charles V harkens to a historical past (become present).  
 All of these parts make up a presentation of a perceptible space that is both imaginary 
and literary, which accounts for and constitutes elements of the sensory—that is the seeing of 
the church, the hearing of the quartet—with elements of a post-sensory; the latter category 
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 80.2
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 254.3
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relies heavily on the imaginary, on taking the detachability of the image it most directly 
presents, and, in doing so, envisioning also a perceptual experience which is heavily durational, 
that is attuned to the perception of time itself. It is the durational aspects of seeing, perhaps, 
which point most directly to the alterity of seeing represented in this passage, into the darkness 
supplanted by the imaginary. 
 In the moment of liminality between sleep and waking, in which the coherence of the 
objects which surround Marcel in his room assume the character not entirely of themselves 
but, insofar as they range themselves by way of an active interpretation, of a reading, the self 
becomes the active maker of the space that surrounds him. In this moment, as it were, Marcel 
literalizes an imaginative refiguration of the world; he engages a nuanced reading of the world 
as if  “[h]e [him]self were the subject of [his] book.” And by this particularity of seeing, in 
which the seeing bears with it a quality of the imagination, and therefore of the self projected 
into the world—and which may be a seeing directed either towards the perception of truth or 
toward a falsification either of the seeing self or the captive object—he is left in a “state of 
darkness” that is both “pleasant and restful.” He is left to reconfigure around him the space 
which he has, in this moment that is fundamentally between, been made incapable of 
adequately deciphering. In darkness, he is released from the habitual modes of seeing, left, as it 
were, to grope and stumble through, to read and interpret at the window the darkened world 
and, in its reflection, an “inner book of unknown symbols,” by which his own self is enacted 
upon the seen world—within a double-seeing.  4
 Marcel Proust, Time Regained, trans. Andreas Mayor, Terence Kilmartin, and D. J. Enright, Modern Library pbk. 4
ed, vol. 6, The Modern Library Classics, (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 274.
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 The composite parts which make up this dualistic seeing, insofar as they are represented 
even in the incipit of the text—within the layerings of seeings which present themselves 
therein to the imagination of Marcel—shall become the object toward which this project is 
directed. The seeing double, the seeing itself, especially in the moment in which it is 
apprehended, is made intelligible, in becoming the object of Proust’s gaze, shall become also 
our own; and the moment which precedes it, that ephemeral moment before the seeing is 
phenomenalized, in which our eyes have yet to distinguish between these objects of our seeing, 
becomes the fugitive moment which can never be seen again, which bears with it the prospect 
of truth itself, of an image of the world whose construction is made apparent to itself.  
 This seeing will become also the mechanism by which the creative act is made possible: 
it is the genesis for the creative seeing, in which the interrelation of objects within the space of 
the world is made entirely apparent but also in which the essential relation of the self to the 
world is most adeptly epitomized; and, likewise, it is written into the ambition underlying the 
creative act, that is, to excavate the essential seeing and, with it, the essential truth which is 
entombed therein, to regain the moment of seeing in which the actual depths of our seeings 
might be plumbed, to traverse these “depths[…] in order to reach them,” such that they may 
be “re-created.”  For, as Julia Kristeva notes, the artistic “genius is nothing but the ‘instinct’ 5
that delves beneath the surface distractions of a plot in order to reach the unconscious, passing 
through the intellect and ‘logical truth’ in order to attain a state of ‘pure joy’ where life is 
indistinguishable from an impression of truth.”  Insofar as this may be true, this project shall 6
 Proust, Time Regained, 303.5
 Julia Kristeva, Time & Sense: Proust and the Experience of Literature, European Perspectives (New York: Columbia 6
University Press, 1996), 202.
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become also, insomuch as it is a series of ruminations upon the nature of seeing as it appears 
within In Search of Lost Time, one which focuses on the ‘re-creation’ of life such that is 
“indistinguishable from an impression of truth,” and upon the moment of seeing as being the 
essential vehicle by which such an impression is made. 
 And though the incipit of the text presents the germinations of what will become a text 
largely driven by seeing itself, and by the capacity in seeing to gain access to other alterior 
seeings, it is also a foreseeing of the text’s end. It is not simply that the moment of sleeping, in 
“the fact that the candle was no longer burning,” might be a prefiguring of the narrator’s 
dying.  For the moment of death in the text is never entirely rendered as a total death, but is 7
conveyed, rather, with the implication of a potential for recreation—not of the body, but 
within the eye, disembodied as it is both in sleep and in the nearing of death. This seeing, in 
the darkness between sleep and waking, might then also be a seeing towards the text’s final 
narrator, who rests in a darkness between life and death, who “f[alls] back exhausted and 
close[s] [his] eyes, not to emerge from a purely vegetal existence before a week had elapsed,” 
and who, only slightly later, will “complete the periphery of [his] walls and close ‘the funeral 
gate.”  It is not that he is dead so much as that he is beyond living, as Marcel at one point 8
notes, in moving through the text, that he is the “I, who was not yet detached from life[…].”  9
As the body withers, it is the eyes which become most active, which approximate the 
movement of which the body had been previously capable; in the closing of ‘the funeral gate’ 
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 1.7
 Proust, Time Regained, 520.8
 Marcel Proust, The Guermantes Way, trans. Charles Kenneth Scott-Moncrieff, Terence Kilmartin, and Dennis Joseph 9
Enright, Modern Library pbk. ed, vol. 3, In Search of Lost Time, (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 428.
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and in the completing of the walled periphery around his own self, the final narrator engages a 
seeing that pushes the limits of any optical logic, that is able to actualize a seeing even as the 
body is effectively dead. 
 The incipit of the text in relation to its closing moments is, thus, implicitly a looking 
forward; the final narrator, likewise, is the narrator in retrospection. In the narrative movement 
of the text—that is, in the compounding of the narrative voice, of two distinct voices that 
approximate and attempt to see one another—it is these forces, of these distinct narrators, 
which enact the most significant instances of a seeing double that occurs, centrally, in time. 
Their interplay engenders the manner in which the text might make manifest an interpretive 
seeing not toward “what we are—but wondering, instead, what we will have been.”  It is the 10
seeing which “would have to be understood according to the paradox of the future (post) 
anterior (modo).”  11
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in writing Phenomenology of Perception, notes, “As I have 
two eyes, I ought to see the object double, and if I see only one of it, that is because I 
construct by means of two images the idea of one object a distance away.”  The Proustian 12
double-seeing enacts itself by a similar manner, becoming the seeing by which the image is 
falsified, by which it enshrouds that which perhaps might otherwise reveal an essential truth; 
and yet, the seeing double becomes also the potentially recuperative act by which the seeing 
may be recovered. For, insofar as “to seek the essence of perception is to declare that perception 
 Joshua Landy, Philosophy As Fiction: Self, Deception, and Knowledge in Proust (Oxford, New York: Oxford University 10
Press, 2004), 125.
 Jean-François Lyotard, “Answering the Question : What Is Postmodernism?,” in Philosophers on Art From Kant to the 11
Postmodernists: A Critical Reader, ed. Christopher Want (Columbia University Press, 2010), 81.
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 12
33.
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is, not presumed true, but defined as access to truth,” then the seeing double—the seeing, as it 
were, of one’s self in the act of seeing—might be the regenerative seeing by which the truth is 
made clear, by which it presents itself, as it were, in the process of seeing and writing oneself.  13
  
 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, xvi.13
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FIGURATION AND DISFIGURATION 
IN THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 
Perhaps the immobility of the things that surround us is forced 
upon them by our conviction that they are themselves and not 
anything else, by the immobility of our conception of them. For it 
always happened that when I awoke like this, and my mind 
struggled in an unsuccessful attempt to discover where I was, 
everything revolved around me through the darkness: things, places, 
years.  14
  
 “The Search for lost time is in fact the search for truth,”  writes Gilles Deleuze in 15
Proust and Signs. Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, as much as it is a treatise on time itself, is also 
a text of vision and seeing, which dwells with its narrator in time and which, in maneuvering 
through time, asks its reader to see along with its narrator things “situated at a great distance”  16
in space as well as in time. It is the truth-seeking, or “the Search,” as it is termed by Deleuze, 
which necessitates a seeing and careful observation of these signs—that is, the elementary 
perceptions which gesture toward an essential truth—and, also, which brings into relief the 
perceptual inadequacies of the human body, whose limits cast their shadow upon the world.  
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 5.14
 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs: The Complete Text, Theory out of Bounds, v. 17 (Minneapolis: University of 15
Minnesota Press, 2000), 15.
 Proust, Time Regained, 520.16
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 Though seeing is in itself perhaps the guiding Proustian method of truth-seeking, it is 
often in the supplemented perceptions made by way of the other senses that these truths may 
be fulfilled. The acknowledgement of signs and the seeking of truths within the Proustian 
world are fulfilled often in the failings inherent to seeing, in those instances in which the limits 
of seeing cast shadows upon the world, which must be fully investigated in order to arrive at a 
complex truth. The Search, in its meandering inquiry into time and space, as an elegy of the 
experience of life lived in and sometimes outside of time, is also necessarily an investigation of 
the means through which we enact ourselves in time, of the experience of the life whose price 
is time itself—and what is the experience of time if not a bodily and sensory experience, to feel 
time as one feels themselves move through a world.  
 Proust exhibits, in his writing, a keen understanding of vision as being both the sense 
of reason and, conversely, the sense by which one might lead themselves to be deceived, 
obscured by the banality of seeing itself and by the habits which accompany it: Swann 
mistakes Odette’s window for another and, after recognizing two shadows within the room, is 
alarmed to find the room occupied by two older gentlemen;  Aunt Léonie’s voyeurism, 17
through her bedroom window, assumes a total knowledge over her neighbours’ activities that is 
 “Amid the glimmering blackness of the row of windows in which the lights had long since been put out, he saw one, 17
and only one, from which percolated[…] the light that filled the room within[…]. Certainly he suffered as he watched 
that light, […]as he listened to that murmur which revealed the presence of the man who had crept in after his own 
departure” (Proust, Swann’s Way, 387). After Swann knocks upon the window and it is finally opened to him, “He looked 
up. Two old gentlemen stood facing him at the window, one of them with a lamp in his hand; and beyond them he could 
see into the room, a room that he had never seen before” (390).
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eventually proven faulty;  Marcel, in watching the ‘little band’, of which Albertine is a part, at 18
Balbec, becomes incapable of being able to distinguish her from them as a group, nor is he 
able to remember where on her face sits the beauty spot he thinks he has noticed in her 
countenance;  and, perhaps most importantly within the text, the occurrence of involuntary 19
memory presents itself through a litany of senses, but never through the seeing eye.  The eye 20
in Proust is the sense of voluntary memory, of habit and assumption, of superficiality (within a 
field of images as opposed to within a depth of things) and projection, of horizontality; it is 
the sense of non-truth.   
 In neglecting to account for the limitations of our own seeing, as is evinced by many of 
the characters that appear throughout In Search of Lost time, one fails also to underscore the 
structures by which their perceptions of the world are made intelligible. Our sense-perception 
is governed by its own causality, a series of logical cues which render that which is perceived, in 
 Marcel describes the gossip in which his aunt would engage with the maid, Françoise: “Thus Françoise and my aunt 18
between them made a critical evaluation, in the course of these morning sessions, of the earliest events of the day. But 
sometimes these events assumed so mysterious or so alarming a character that my aunt felt she could not wait until it was 
time for Françoise to come upstairs, and then a formidable and quadruple peal would resound through the 
house” (Proust, Swann’s Way, 75). Aunt Léonie’s totalizing gaze from the window, in the cases in which the events fail to 
uphold the logic by which they normally make themselves apparent; these sessions spent gossiping between Françoise and 
Aunt Léonie bear testament to a certain faultiness by which the logic of seeing, even in the totalizing gaze herein 
presented by Léonie at her window, might be circumvented in the act of seeing.
 Marcel notes, “to conclude this account of my first introduction to Albertine, when trying to recapture that little 19
beauty spot on her cheek, just under the eye, I remembered that, looking from Elstir’s window when Albertine had gone 
by, I had seen it on her chin. In fact, when I saw her I noticed that she had a beauty spot, but my errant memory made it 
wander about her face, fixing it now in one place, now in another” (Marcel Proust, Within a Budding Grove, trans. 
Charles Kenneth Scott-Moncrieff, Terence Kilmartin, and Dennis Joseph Enright, Modern Library pbk. ed, vol. 2, In 
Search of Lost Time, (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 622). “Shortly after this, one morning when it had been 
raining and was almost cold, I was accosted on the front by a girl wearing a little toque and carrying a muff, so different 
from the girl whom I had met at Elstir’s party that to recognise in her the same person seemed an operation beyond the 
power of the human mind” (622-623).
 A brief summary of the primary instances of involuntary memory within In Search of Lost Time reveals that the sense of 20
vision plays no role in involuntary memory. The first such instance, the madeleine episode, in which Marcel dips a 
madeleine into a cup of tea and, in tasting it, is confronted with the involuntary memory of his childhood at Combray, 
occurs in Proust, Swann’s Way, 60. An incomplete list of incidences of involuntary memory within the text appears also in 
Samuel Beckett, Proust (New York : Grove Press, 1970), 23.
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its rawness, into intelligible figures; and, therefore, such a perception cannot in itself be the 
arbiter of reason in one’s appraisal of the world. The occurrence of a causality of seeing can be 
traced between the symbolic use of language and the visually perceptible. For in the case of the 
intelligibility of sense-perception, that is the clarification of a distinct act of seeing in the 
moments immediately following it, the moment in question is subjected then to a certain 
disfiguration of its own form in time; such a clarification of visual phenomena is linguistic, or 
descriptive, and requires itself to be qualified within an indefinite future, that is, described 
such that it can be remembered. For it is not the seminal moment of sense-perception which 
lingers, but the residual effect of the moment, as it is overseen by the correlative and 
interdependent nature of language and seeing. The nature of seeing, then, is such that it must 
always exist essentially within an anticipated past—detached, as a memory—and therefore 
“would have to be understood according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo).”   21
 Marcel, in the unintelligible moment in which he wakes up one morning, in which, 
also, it becomes less determinate as to whether he is entirely asleep or awake, finds himself in 
the liminal space between dreaming and waking, between figurations of different sorts. “My 
sight would return,” he notes, “and I would be astonished to find myself in a state of 
darkness.”  Moments later, as he begins to become more firmly fixed within the world, as the 22
process of waking allows the objects in the room which ought to surround him to range 
themselves anew, he notes, “[…]now well awake; my body had veered round for the last time 
and the good angel of certainty had made all the surrounding objects stand still, had set me 
 Jean-François Lyotard, “Answering the Question : What Is Postmodernism?” in Philosophers on Art From Kant to the 21
Postmodernists: A Critical Reader, ed. Christopher Want (Columbia University Press, 2010), 81.
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 1.22
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down under my bedclothes, in my bedroom, and had fixed, approximately in their right places 
in the uncertain light[…] both the doors.”   23
 In the process of waking, the gradual enclosing of sight phenomena into easily defined 
figures, fixed in their right places, beckons toward a process of refiguration by which the 
imaginary dreamscape is supplanted by the refiguring of phenomena within the visual field. In 
the uncertain light, though, in which the forms fail to connect themselves so adequately with 
the idea with which they are habitually associated, being only, as it were, “fixe[d] 
approximately in their right places,” such forms for a moment resist phenomenalization. 
Markedly, Marcel expresses relief at the objects within the room having been made to stand 
still; habit has steadied and reasserted itself. For a moment, though, it appears as if the object 
themselves had resisted their own refiguration. 
 The refiguration of objects in the moment of waking, which constitutes a re-
phenomenalization of the object, a becoming fixed in its form, mirrors also the rendering of 
such phenomena into recognizable forms by way of language; the act of making intelligible 
that which is most immediately and presently felt in the act of seeing is to make discernible 
these phenomena, to reason with them and to sever them irremediably from the direct 
moment of their apprehension. It is actually by this process that a perceived entity becomes a 
phenomenon, “mean[ing] in Greek: what looks like something what ‘seems,’ ‘semblance.”  24
The object of a seeing has no semblance, is not “a good that looks like,”  until it has become a 25
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 9.23
 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), ed. David Farrell Krell, 24
Rev. and expanded ed (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2008), 74.
 Heidegger, Basic Writings, 74.25
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phenomenon, which is to say that is has been made intelligible, until it has been reasoned to 
have happened and to have been experienced by way of a visual sense-perception.  
 The phenomenalization of an entity perceived, which follows from a linguistic 
mediation of the perceiving eye, simultaneously connotes a sense-object that is disfigured as it 
is made sensible, it obscures the formal intricacies of that which is seen; that what has become 
of our primary vision of the world is itself phenomenal creates an equivalence between the act 
of seeing and the act of disfiguring, of hiding the form or figure of what is beheld. Yet, it is 
also, perhaps, by way of language that we might efface the disfiguration of our own seeing. For, 
as Marcel notices in the afterglow of what is a fairly immediate act of retrospection upon 
seeing the steeples of Martinville, “that what lay hidden behind the[m…] must be analogous 
to a pretty phrase, since it was in the form of words which gave me pleasure that it had 
appeared to me.”  He notices, first, that it is by way of language that his immediate seeing has 26
been taken away, hidden from him, but that it was also by way of his own language that the 
steeples might be returned to him. 
 Since the apprehension of a phenomenon, the possibility of obtaining access to the 
form itself of the phenomenalized object, must take place in a retrospective effort, then one’s 
own ability to assume an active role in the moment of one’s own seeing, to engage with forms 
directly, without having one’s immediate seeing complicated by nascent and forming 
reasonings which dress the phenomenon and make it presentable, is suitably problematized. 
Since the actual seeing is seemingly only made possible in retrospect, then there is an essential 
separation in the image itself from the moment at which the perception is made; one, 
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 255.26
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necessarily, looks back at, and therefore observes a seeing displaced from the moment at which 
it was made as a fragment in time, in stasis, unmoving. 
 To see and to succumb blindly to the habit of association between seeing and reason is 
to separate one’s self from the world by way of distance. It is to put one’s trust fully in the 
truths presented by a world of order grounded in the solidity and impenetrability of objects at 
a distance, to take the world as it is or, more likely, as one expects it to be, without 
acknowledgement of the self in relation to the world or of the dynamism of the world itself 
and of those things which inhabit it. In the sense that seeing might be an act of ignoring the 
dynamic movement of things within the world, then it is also a disavowal of time itself; the 
seeing presented, as we will return to later, is one in which the detachability of the image 
presents also the image of a world in timeless stasis. 
 The distance inherent to seeing, which follows necessarily from the displacement of 
seeing in time and, similarly, from the disfiguration of the seen by way of habit and language, 
is paralleled in the mere physical act of seeing; in contrasting the act of seeing with the other 
faculties of sense-perception, we might perhaps better understand the physical structures 
which underlie the epistemological problems by which the act of seeing is transformed before 
our own eyes. Hans Jonas’ essay, The Nobility of Sight describes a phenomenology of seeing as a 
component of a larger phenomenological endeavour into the epistemologies of the senses. He 
distinguishes sight and the creation of the image, termed the “image-performance,” as 
implicating of three particular characteristics: “simultaneity in the presentation of a manifold, 
neutralization of the causality of sense-affection, distance in the spatial and mental senses.”   27
 Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 13627
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 The first of these, a “simultaneity in the presentation of a manifold,” implies the 
privileging of static objects in a spatial field and, thus, that in seeing a manifold of objects, one 
comprehends a static image of a world that is presently, that is “as a lasting of the same… [an] 
unmoved, continued present—so long as no change occurs in the objects themselves.”  The 28
first characteristic denotes the seeing of a static world of being as opposed to a dynamic world 
of becoming, such that seeing becomes the sense of detachability under the guise of 
uniformity, failing then to describe in any way the interrelationships present within a moving 
world. 
 The second, a “neutralization of the causality of sense-affection,” implies the 
detachment of the subject from the object, who otherwise would require themselves to be in 
intercourse with the world—that is, either affecting themselves either upon an object (as in the 
case of touch) or allowing an object to impress itself upon themselves (as in the case of 
hearing). “The gain,” writes Jonas,  
is the concept of objectivity, of the thing as it is in itself as distinct from the 
thing as it affects me, and from this distinction arises the whole idea of theoria 
and theoretical truth. Furthermore, the image is handed over to the 
imagination, which can deal with it in complete detachment from the actual 
presence of the original object: the detachability of the image, i.e., of ‘form’ 
from its ‘matter,’ of ‘essence’ from ‘existence,’ is at the bottom of abstraction and 
therefore of all free thought.  29
This detachment evinces the means by which sight, through the ease of its own perceptive 
abilities, precedes the idea of theory as separate from practice, of form as separate from matter
—as, at once, the means through which one is able to access the indefinite and the impossible 
 Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, 144.28
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or, at least, that which is not yet definite or possible, and also the means through which one 
assumes the stagnancy of a world of manifold objects. It is the sense of immateriality under the 
guise of the sense of objectivity, beneath the speciousness of what we take to be an empirical 
mode of perception. 
 The third characteristic, a “distance in the spatial and mental senses,” describes the 
distance inherent in the act of seeing and the unique ability for sight to assume the role of “the 
ideal distance-sense.”  It is this characteristic which gives shape to sight as being the 30
perceptual mode which presupposes, by way of an “indefinite “and so on”… the birthplace of 
the idea of infinity.”  It seems, also, given that the acuity of vision decreases little, especially 31
relative to the other senses, as distance between the observer and the observed increases, that 
this characteristic points to a “disinterested beholding,”  and thus leads to vision as a sense of 32
habit and disengagement in its own right, which places one through habitual interactions at a 
distance from the world through which they move and describe. If seeing is the sense of habit, 
given that it is the most readily available and, seemingly, the most encompassing of a manifold 
of objects in a visual field, then it should also be the sense which we are most unwilling to 
focalize our own attention toward, by which we are made negligent to call into question the 
habits which make up our most fundamental epistemological inquisitions into such things as 
space and time, and through which we have formed the buttresses upon which rests our 
relationship with the world at large (and, also, at a microscopic level). 
 Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, 149.30
 Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, 150.31
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 Jonas points, then, toward that which one stands to gain in the act of seeing: the 
conception of distance itself; the conception of totality, both in the perception of a manifold 
of objects within a visual field and in the ability to see through distances otherwise 
imperceptible, therefore leading to “the birthplace of the idea of infinity,” but leading also to 
the assumption of mastery. What is implicit, though, in his understanding of the apparatus of 
vision, which effects itself best in a distancing of the viewer from the viewed, is that the ideal 
function of vision, whose “gain is the concept of objectivity, of the thing in itself as different 
from the thing as it affects me,” presupposes an objectivity not founded upon the object in its 
object-ness, but, crucially, in its figuration. For it is not in the matter or materiality of the 
object that it qualifies its own object-ness to the seeing eye, but rather in its formal qualities.  
 What then, to the seeing eye, is the difference between the image of a rock in situ and 
the image of a rock as projection? The act of projection is one of replacing the relationality, by 
which we might otherwise, and by way of other senses, actively interrelate with objects and 
subjects within the world, with the perceptual speciousness inherent to a voyeurism, whose 
claim is one of objectivity, but whose reality, as we will come to see, is in the projections of the 
self onto the other. The voyeur fills that which falls within their visual field as best as they are 
capable, by their own habits, memories, and projections.  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VOYEURISM AND PROJECTION:  
READING AND WRITING THROUGH THE WINDOW 
I gazed at her, at first with that gaze which is not merely the 
messenger of the eyes, but at whose window all the senses assemble 
and lean out, petrified and anxious, a gaze eager to reach, touch, 
capture, bear off in triumph the body at which it is aimed, and the 
soul with the body[…].  33
 What becomes abundantly clear, in the reading of In Search of Lost Time, is the pleasure 
which its hero takes in the act of watching, in seeing and not being seen. This voyeuristic 
dualism, as it enacts a dissociation between the self and the world, and thereby places the 
narrator at an irreconcilable distance from that which he is immediately observing, becomes 
also a means through which the projection of the self, whose desires muddy themselves in 
representations of the real, may come to exist in the world. Most often, the voyeuristic seeings 
within the text, the self effectively seeing the world without their own active participation in it, 
literalize the opposition of the voyeur with that which is being seen in the symbolic use of 
space. 
 The window, above all, stands out as being a particularly adept symbolization of this 
distance; in the compounding instances of voyeurism within the text, the window becomes the 
medium and the image most inextricable from the voyeur: it becomes the most consequential 
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 198.33
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symbol of a distance existing in seeings directed by Marcel both inward and outward, both in 
the seeing of one’s self and in the seeing of an other. For it is the function of the window to 
place in opposition the seeing eye and the object of their gaze, since the voyeur’s seeing passes 
necessarily through the window; and yet, it is also the window whose materiality is 
misinterpreted, which stands singularly as a transparent and therefore effectively neutral 
medium by which judgement is passed in the act of seeing.  
 The window, in the act of perception, seems, in its physical imperceptibility, ineffectual 
in the act of seeing; yet, the window is also the reflective surface of desire and, likewise, the 
impenetrable barrier which enacts a separation and presupposes, then, an irreconcilability of 
the voyeur with the image of desire. The window of Proust, even as it allows Marcel to remain 
imperceptible in an act of direct and seemingly clear-eyed seeing, enacts its own effect of 
distancing and disfiguration. Insofar as it is both the vehicle and the downfall of the 
voyeuristic perspective, it becomes also the legitimization of both the pleasure and pain to be 
taken in the voyeuristic experience. Such a “pain-pleasure” duality is found primarily in the 
text, as Howard Moss notes, in “helplessness—the watching of the performance of others, 
either childishly,[…] sexually and literally;[…] or figuratively.”   34
 Howard Moss, The Magic Lantern of Marcel Proust (London: Faber & Faber, 1963), 69. In an entire chapter devoted to 34
the imagery of windows within In Search of Lost Time, Moss frames the voyeurism by way of the window primarily as a 
seeing of the unimaginable, of “horrifying vision[s] of sexual love” (75). Though the relationship between the seeing self 
and the other through the window is of vital importance to this chapter and, likewise, the projection of one’s own 
phantasies through the window is necessary to this project, Moss explicitly tracks the imagery of the window as it 
pertains to sadistic behaviour and homosexuality within the text, which is not within the scope of this project. See also 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet (University of California Press, 2008) and, specifically, the chapter, 
Proust and the Spectacle of the Closet, for a reading of Proust which treads between positivist and anti-positivist readings of 
homosexuality in the prefatory section of Sodom and Gomorrah and investigates this developing spectacle as it appears to 
the narrator.
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 At Montjouvain, Marcel arrives, in somewhat dubious circumstances, before the 
window of the Vinteuil home and sees, through the window, Mlle Vinteuil:  “The window 35
was partly open; the lamp was lighted; I could watch her every movement without her being 
able to see me; but if I had moved away I would have made a rustling sound among the 
bushes, she would have heard me, and she might have thought that I had been hiding there in 
order to spy upon her.”  Marcel here describes the helplessness of the voyeur: the seeing is 36
coupled with the inability to move and preempts, then, a disembodied seeing: the body, 
immobile, in stasis, gives way to the disembodied eye.  
 The window becomes also, in its reflectivity, the symbol of this disembodiment, since it 
affords to the one seeing the ability to look through but also to look reflectively, to look back 
at oneself. It allows oneself to see oneself—as a vision, and so as a distinct other. This 
particular scene, in describing the relationship of the voyeur to that which they are seeing, 
exemplifies the characteristics of seeing through the window: the ability, that is granted by its 
apparatus, to remain inconspicuous in the act of seeing (both the other and the seeing self ), 
which requires one to forfeit their bodily function, to remain in stasis, helpless. 
 The motif of the window, as a symbol of voyeurism in the text, becomes not only a 
symbol of Marcel’s helplessness before the other; it also stands as the synthesized image of an 
implicit ‘double-seeing’ which comes to pervade the text. “As I have two eyes,” writes Merleau-
Ponty, “I ought to see the object double, and if I see only one of it, that is because I construct 
 It is worth noting here, since we have yet to fully touch upon the exact impact of M. Vinteuil upon Marcel’s seeings, 35
nor of his musical genius upon Marcel’s written oeuvre, that Mlle Vinteuil is the daughter of M. Vinteuil, whose ‘petite 
phrase’ becomes the “national anthem” of Swann and Odette’s love and whose “glowing” septet will later play a similar 
role in Marcel’s love for Albertine.
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 224-225.36
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by means of two images the idea of one object a distance away.”  And, similarly, as our 37
narrator, following Swann, indulges serially his own phantasies in the moments of voyeurism, 
and thereby recognizes them in the other, then we must also acknowledge a double-seeing 
wherein the two properties of the window synthesize an image of two distinct seeings: the first, 
simply, is a seeing  directly of an object, which passes through the transparency of the window; 
the second, which becomes of the reflectivity of the window, denotes the impression of the self 
into the act of seeing. The synthesis of the double-seeing which passes through the window, 
then, is the synthesis of the seeing of one’s self with the seeing of the other.  
 “In Proust,” writes Moss, “the window is, psychologically, the voyeur’s picture.[…] 
Contributing a power within himself to what he sees, Marcel is the victim of what is to be 
seen.”  Moss’ reading centres on the window as the symbol of the self-victimization of the 38
voyeur by their own sexual and projected phantasies, “a ‘peep-hole’ behind which a once 
unimagined, and now desired and detested action takes place.”  And yet the window becomes 39
also a symbol of seeing itself, explicated in the formation of Marcel’s seeings through the 
window over time and throughout the text. In becoming the victim of his own self in the act 
of seeing, and in failing to acknowledge the reflexivity of the voyeuristic apparatus, he becomes 
neglectful of the habits which constitute his own seeings, of his own self and his growing 
delusion. 
 The window becomes synonymous with a double-seeing, not of two images of 
similitude synthesized for the benefit of perspective—not implicitly as a means toward 
 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 33.37
 Moss, The Magic Lantern of Marcel Proust, 55.38
 Moss, The Magic Lantern of Marcel Proust, 75.39
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quantifying the distance at which one stands from that which they are seeing—but rather with 
a seeing of the self mapped onto the seeing of the world. The window stands as the medium 
through which judgement is passed upon the world in the search for truth; the double-image 
is taken to be a synthesizing and totalizing whole, the becoming of a totality that 
problematizes the distinction between the self and the world. Such judgement passed, as it 
were, without its being interpreted by the viewer, “instead of being a transcendental activity,
[…] becomes simply a logical activity of drawing a conclusion.”   40
 The problem of double-seeing, of projecting the self in the voyeuristic act of seeing, is 
analogized within the opening pages of the text: 
Nearly midnight. The hour when an invalid, who has been obliged to set out 
on a journey and to sleep in a strange hotel, awakened by a sudden spasm, sees 
with glad relief a streak of daylight showing under his door. Thank God, it is 
morning! The servants will be about in a minute: he can ring, and someone 
will come to look after him. The thought of being assuaged gives him strength 
to endure his pain. He is certain he heard footsteps: they come nearer, and then 
die away. The ray of the light beneath his door is extinguished. It is midnight; 
someone has just turned down the gas; the last servant has gone to bed, and he 
must lie all night suffering without remedy.  41
The pleasure in helplessness is herein immediately followed by the pain of a phantasy 
unrealized; the desire of the invalid to have someone come to look after him, overtly expressed 
in the description of the seeing, and hearing, of the servants beyond the door, mars the 
impression of the perception at its most fundamental level. The perception of the footsteps 
beyond the door, the seeing of light through what may be seen as an analogy to the window, 
becomes a mirror of the desire that the invalid expresses. His wants are realized only in the 
 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 33.40
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 2.41
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pain of having then to go without; the perception is faulty and the truth misleading, blinded 
as he is in the act of seeing double. The interpretation being not one in the realization of truth, 
but rather in the judgement of phenomena toward the conclusion already having been 
previously expressed as phantasy, the window in this moment becomes, then, a reflective 
medium but also the barrier by which the image allows itself to be detached: it becomes, then, 
the object of the imagination, of willful deceit. We see here, in this passage, the imagination 
wielded against the search for truth. The window, in affording the distance of the seeing self 
and the object of their gaze, in precluding the detachability of such an image, allows for an 
introspective and retrospective viewing even as it entangles such an experience in the 
phenomena of the double-image. 
 The narrator, reading in Combray, begins to form the incipient image of the window. 
He begins to understand the means by which the empiricist function of the window is 
wrought in the voyeuristic seeing. He notes, 
And then my thoughts, too, formed a similar sort of recess [as in the dim 
coolness of my room], in the depths of which I felt that I could bury myself and 
remain invisible even while I looked at what went on outside. When I saw an 
external object, my consciousness that I was seeing it would remain between me 
and it, surrounding it with a thin spiritual border that prevented me from ever 
touching its substance directly; for it would somehow evaporate before I could 
make contact with it, just as an incandescent body that is brought into 
proximity with something wet never actually touches its moisture, since it is 
always preceded by a zone of evaporation.  42
In the acknowledgement of his own consciousness in interplay with the phenomena of the 
world, Marcel becomes complicit in the creation of meaning as enabled by the act of 
voyeurism. The spiritual border, which also prevented him from being able to directly touch 
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 115.42
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the substance of the external object, becomes also that which invests the world with the 
qualities of phantasy. In effect, Marcel begins to form an awareness in these moments of the 
relationship cultivated between the self and the world, such that the world assumes its 
materiality in voyeurism not by way of its actual substance, but rather in the projection of the 
imagining and desiring self into the world.  
 It is this interplay, of the imaginative seeing with the seeing of the physical world, that 
also precludes the writerly approach to being-in-the-world, the autofictional, the 
fictionalization of the real, which at once engenders the phenomenal disfiguration of objects in 
the world, whilst investing them with a new substance emanating from the consciousness of 
the viewer. In its incipience, the habits associated with voyeurism and the window are 
analogous with the misappraisal of truths of the self and truths of the world within a faulty 
double-image; in their interplay, though, and in the act of distinguishing one from the other, 
Marcel perhaps also evinces what will become an alterior mode of seeing, one that is, or will 
come to be, quintessentially literary—that is, to see one’s own selves.  
 We should not treat the window, then, as merely the image of an anti-empiricist seeing, 
nor even as the image of an epistemological impossibility, but, in Proust’s terms, as “the 
shadow is to the sunbeam, that is to say equally luminous, and presented to my imagination 
[that] which my senses[…] could have tasted and enjoyed only piecemeal.”  And though such 43
seeings arise truly only later in the text, as the apprenticeship in the mastery of signs joins the 
narrating Marcel with the Marcel having narrated, it is more worthwhile, it seems to me, to 
examine closely the moments in which they originate, in which they are described fully and 
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 114.43
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are neither enclosed within the habitude of our narrator nor entirely dehabitualized. For it is, 
in fact, in the slow and spiralling journey to reconstitute his habits, and consequently in the 
unseeing as a means to see again, that Marcel is finally enabled in the writing of his oeuvre, is 
finally allowed by Proust to assume an altogether totalizing point of seeing. 
 The vantage point from which the final narrator recounts becomes only presently 
available to the reader in the final moments of Time Regained, in the closing of “the funeral 
gate,”  and, until then, appears only intermittently as gestures from a distant self ‘beyond the 44
grave’, from an “I, who was not yet detached from life[…].”  The closing of the funeral gate, 45
the anticipation of death itself and the disembodiment by which it is accompanied, a 
disembodiment perhaps able to prompt another seeing, is paralleled to some degree in the 
concluding moments of the Montjouvain episode.  
 “I heard no more,” Marcel notes, “for Mlle Vinteuil[…] came to the window and drew 
the shutters close.”  He, however, continues: “And yet I have since reflected that if M. 46
Vinteuil had been able to be present at this scene, he might still, in spite of everything, have 
continued to believe in his daughter’s goodness of heart, and perhaps in so doing would not 
have been altogether wrong.”  The window as a symbol becomes also the literary vehicle 47
which enables the reflection. To have invested himself in this moment with the perspective of 
 Proust, Time Regained, 520.44
 Proust, The Guermantes Way, 428.45
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 230.46
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 230. Marcel, watching through the window at Montjouvain, witnesses Mlle Vinteuil and her 47
lesbian lover in what is the first explicit appearance of the themes of homosexuality and sadism in the text, themes which 
becomes more and more present within the text. Marcel’s reflection on behalf of Vinteuil follows a moment in which 
Mlle Vinteuil’s lover threatens to spit on a photograph of the deceased father after mocking him. It is, therefore, in the 
context of such “cruel offences as those of Mlle Vinteuil against the memory and wishes of her dead father” (231) that 
Marcel continues to ruminate on the sadistic events of which he has borne witness.
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the recently deceased Vinteuil is not only a disembodiment of his own self but a becoming 
directed toward his final, literary self. He is drawn out of himself and simultaneously into the 
perspective of the deceased, and thereby disembodied, Vinteuil; he is drawn again, thereby, 
into the room to which he has just played voyeur.  
 The window closing, it seems, is only the prelude to another seeing, to a reflection from 
the perspective of an other; the scene places the window at the threshold of an absolute 
othering, of complete separation and disembodiment, but also of an unlikely empathy. That 
which begins initially as a distinct and voyeuristic seeing, becomes, in the invocation of the 
presumed will of the deceased Vinteuil, a uniquely literary seeing, a projection in which 
Marcel is reembodied as the missing and deceased father in the room he has just been made 
unable to see. The closing of the shutters, of the half-open window, does not manifest a change 
in the voyeuristic seeing and the disembodiment of the self in such an act of seeing; it only 
obstructs the most direct means of access. 
 Insofar as the window represents a voyeuristic seeing that, in its essence, disembodies 
the viewer, and leaves them closer to death than to the life which they are helpless to affect—as 
Marcel seeing through the window at Montjouvain provides what he imagines would be the 
seeing of the deceased Vinteuil, even after the window has closed—then the window’s 
recurrence as a symbol can be perhaps also indicative of a narrative of seeing as it pertains to 
Marcel, as a trajectory, as it were, from the succumbing to the epistemological problem 
presented by the window, to another seeing entirely. 
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 Published in Le Spleen de Paris over a half-decade before In Search of Lost Time, 
Baudelaire’s poem, Les Fenêtres, or in English, Windows, conceives of a seeing through the 
window which, in many ways, may have guided the Proustian effort: 
  He who looks from outside through an open window never sees as he 
who looks through a window closed. There is no more profound object: none 
more mysterious, more fruitful, more somber, nor more dazzling than the 
window lit by a candle. That which one might see in the sun’s light is always 
less desirable than that which passes behind the window’s panes. 
  In this hole, black or luminous, lives life, dreams life, suffers life. 
  Beyond waves of roof, I espy an older woman, wrinkled already, poor, 
always bent against some thing, and who never leaves. With her face, with her 
dress, with her movement, with so little for me to know, I rebuilt the story of 
this woman, or more so, I rebuilt her legend, and sometimes I recount it to 
myself through tears. 
  If this had been a poor old man, I would have remade him just as 
easily. 
  And I fall asleep, proud to have lived and suffered in another, in a life 
other than my own. 
  Perhaps you will say to me: “Are you sure that this legend is the truth?” 
What does it matter what reality may be when placed outside my self, if it has 
helped me to live, to feel that I am and to feel that which I am?  48
In similar fashion to Proust, Baudelaire accesses here a particular duality of the window: that 
the window is the image of absolute distance and separation. As Georges Poulet notes in 
Proustian Space: 
Things are, but they are at a distance. A distance which is impossible for them 
to suppress or reduce. In the Proustian universe, it is never allowed to draw 
near, to touch, to establish ones with others, in the intimacy of neighbourhood. 
All that is living in it is living in solitude. And the feeling of distance, which, 
under one form or another, never ceases to manifest itself, confounds itself with 
the anguished feeling of existence. At the bottom of all desires there is an 
impotency, inherent in the very nature of beings, that forbids their attaining 
 Charles Baudelaire, Le Spleen de Paris: Petits Poèmes en Prose, ed. Jean-Luc Steinmetz, Le Livre de Poche Classiques 48
16120 (Paris: Libraire Generale Francaise, 2010), 173. My own translation.
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the object of their desires. To desire is to render apparent a distance apart. To 
love is to see escape in the distance the being one loves.  49
It is this absolute distance which renders itself apparent most clearly through the window; and 
yet, ‘with so little for [one] to know,’ it affords one also the opportunity to mythologize the 
personage of the other. The other becomes a character, fictionalized, and yet more real than 
they might ever otherwise have been to the narrator. Baudelaire’s speaker understands this 
complication: that the intimacy in which he finds himself with the older woman is not a 
shared one, and that such an intimacy is not founded upon a ‘truth’ so much as it becomes a 
‘legend,’ becomes something which, having never existed, touches still upon the seminal 
feeling of an encounter and seeks to bring it to its highest relief. The encounter is not shared; it 
is transcendental, if it is at all, only to the voyeur, and so the function of the window is one 
which occurs seemingly only in the service of the narrator.  
 The fictionalization of the other, the rendering of an intersection of the object-ness of 
the other and the phantasy of the viewer, is striking in its devotion to a radical subjectivity, in 
its eye which has no interest in factoring into it an approximation of the eye of the other; and 
yet, there is a quality of this interaction which touches on the transcendental. For as much as 
the window is a separation from the other, it is also the means by which the other is 
mythologized; it is a projected, and thereby imaginary, reconciliation of the self and the other. 
The imaginary, here, does not necessarily point to the creative act. The disfiguration of the 
other through the window may just as well be an operation performed by the imaginative 
subconscious, a destruction and reconstitution of one’s own phantasy in an other, but such 
invocation of the imaginary prefigures the creative act which rests at the heart of In Search of 
 Georges Poulet, Proustian Space, trans. Elliott Coleman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 42.49
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Lost Time and which is alluded to in this particular poem. In the “rebuil[ding of ] the history of 
this woman,” and in the “rebuil[ding of ] her legend,” the workings of the imagination seek to 
revivify that which is observed in darkness. It is in the attempt to bring outward that which is 
seen in the window, that which Baudelaire sees in the “hole, black or luminous,” that a certain 
creative act, an art-making, might originate. 
 Marcel, while in his room reading, begins to form the image of the essential 
relationship between seeing through the window and a creative imaginary, a forming creative 
seeing paralleled in both its outward and inward movement. He notes, “This dim coolness of 
my room was to the broad daylight of the street what the shadow is to the sunbeam, that is to 
say equally luminous, and presented to my imagination [that] which my senses[…] could have 
tasted and enjoyed only piecemeal.”  And slightly later, after his grandmother has pushed him 50
to venture outside, where he continues reading, “And then my thoughts, too, formed a similar 
sort of recess[…],”  he notes. Such a comparison, of a relationship in space rooted in an 51
essential difference between that which is inside and that which is outside the house, here 
becomes a relationship which maps itself onto the internality and externality of our narrator 
himself.  
 That such an awareness comes to him in the act of reading is important. “[This] is,” 
after all, “the story of how a little boy became a writer,”  and, says Deleuze, in the Proustian 52
world “we learn nothing except by deciphering and interpreting,”  that is to say, by reading. 53
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 114.50
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In mapping the dichotomy of his own reading self beside the window in the “dim coolness of 
his room” with that which is outside the window, in noting their equal luminosity, the activity 
of reading is extended beyond the confines of the immediately accessible text and thrust into 
an interaction between the self and the world. Such an interrelationship is mirrored later when 
such a duality, of legibility of a different sort within both an interiority and an exteriority, are 
mapped more intricately upon Marcel’s own self. The activity of reading, Proust would lead us 
to believe, is as much in the world of things as it is in the text; it is as much in the darkness as 
it is in the light; and it is as much in one’s own self as it is outside oneself. 
 Marcel, ruminating later on the nature of truths, the deciphering of signs, and on his 
own memory, writes: 
As for the inner book of unknown symbols (symbols carved in relief they might 
have been, which my attention, as it explored my unconscious, groped for and 
stumbled against and followed the contours of, like a diver exploring the ocean-
bed), if I tried to read them no one could help me with any rules, for to read 
them was an act of creation in which no one can do our work for us or even 
collaborate with us.  54
The window exists, then, not only as the medium through which is mediated an encounter 
with the other, but also as the medium through which one might access the seeing of one’s 
own self. For in both there in an inherence of symbols, of signs which exist within them, 
which one must attend to in one’s own interpretive mode, in one’s own reading; the window 
assumes a phenomenal encounter with the world as with one’s own self, a process of 
deciphering, an intentionality to exploring the shadows, in their own luminosity, to excavate, 
as it were, the phenomenal aspect of the window, or to unconsciously preserve it, to have its 
 Proust, Time Regained, 274.54
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interaction with the world tinge it, though its proximity would affect, and would at times 
drastically colour one’s interaction with the world.  
 The failure to see through the window, evinced in the instances in which the window 
provides the basis for the necessary delusion, refers back to the window as a sign itself, as the 
nascent image of an optical tool by which the narrator, as reader-writer, makes sense of the 
world. When, as at Montjouvain, the window is closed, that which has become of seeing 
through the window, that which has guided the narrator through these seeings since the 
earliest moments of the text,  become the instruments of the writing: they act as catalysts to 55
an ability to see through the medium of the window; to grasp the distance inherent in this 
seeing and, thereby, the question of accessibility and inaccessibility; to see oneself in the 
window alongside that which is immediately present within the field of vision, that is to 
understand one’s own projected presence in the act of seeing. The window, even after it has 
become closed, remains, under the guise of reading and writing the world, a central image 
within the text. 
 As Beckett notes, "The creation of the [Proustian] world did not take place once and 
for all time but takes place every day,”  which is to say that it is a world that resists stagnation, 56
that it is in constant flux, a state of defiguration and recreation. It is a world that is conscious 
of its own creation and recreation, that engages with an ongoing refigurative process qualified 
by the essential creative act. The seeing of the world, and the being-in-the-world, is the process 
 I am speaking, here, of the analogy of the invalid and also of the magic lantern episode, which both appear within the 55
opening pages of Swann’s Way.
 Beckett, Proust, 8.56
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of art-making itself, it is interpretive, to be “groped for and stumbled against.”  In reading, we 57
are figuring the written world, “a book of unknown symbols” whose reading is “an act of 
creation in which no one can do our work for us.”  In being-in-the-world, the self draws 58
similarly from the chasm of symbols, of signs in the world, and refigures them around their 
self.  
 Reading through the window leads to a writing through the window; the window, first 
an epistemological barrier, a conflation of self against the other, becomes an instrument, a 
technological variegation of seeing, toward the writing of the world. To learn to see through 
the window is to write, and to write through the window is to understand the distance at 
which one stands from the other, a distance of absolute impossibility bridged only in a 
distinctive writing and seeing: in writing, as the return of the signs of reading to one’s self; in 
seeing, as the return of the signs of reading the world to one’s self, thus the observation therein 
of one’s own self in the window alongside an inaccessible other. 
 Marcel, before the window in his room at the hotel in Balbec, invokes Elstir as being 
the foremost practitioner of transcending the distancing inherent to the window in the process 
of art-making: 
Sometimes, at my window in the hotel at Balbec, in the morning when 
Françoise undid the blankets that shut out the light, or in the evening when I 
was waiting until it was time to go out with Saint-Loup, I had been led by 
some effect of sunlight to mistake what was only a darker stretch of sea for a 
distant coastline, or to gaze delightedly at a belt of liquid azure without 
knowing whether it belonged to sea or sky. But presently my reason would 
reestablish between the elements the distinction which my first impression had 
 Proust, Time Regained, 274.57
 Proust, Time Regained, 274.58
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abolished.[…] But the rare moments in which we see nature as it is, poetically, 
were those from which Elstir’s work was created.  59
And, slightly later, Marcel, in maneuvering through Elstir’s studio, describes in ekphrasis, itself 
the unique application of a creative writing in the description of another work of art, the exact 
manner in which the visual phenomena, presented in encounters through the window but also 
in the writing of the Proustian world at large, might be written; presented, then, is the manner 
in which such an interaction between the self and the world, and, thus, an interaction between 
the voyeur and the world through the window, might be reconciled in the practice of art-
making: 
Now the effort made by Elstir to reproduce things not as he knew them to be 
but according to the optical illusions of which our first sight of them is 
composed, had led him precisely to bring out certain of these laws of 
perspective, which were thus all the more striking, since art had been the first to 
disclose them. A river, because of the windings of its course, a bay because of the 
apparent proximity to one another of the cliffs on either side of it, would seem 
to have hollowed out in the heart of the plain or of the mountains a lake 
absolutely landlocked on every side. In a picture of a view from Balbec painted 
upon a scorching day in summer an inlet of the sea, enclosed between walls of 
pink granite, appeared not to be the sea, which began further out. The 
continuity of the ocean was suggested only by the gulls which, wheeling over 
what seemed to be solid rock, were as a matter of fact sniffing the moist vapour 
of the shifting tide.  60
The double-seeing, as it were, of the sea and land indistinguishable from one another, a 
conception of the world which describes a relationship of diametrical opposition as one of 
continuity, acts as a nullification of the distance between them in the act of art-making. 
Marcel, in his ekphrastic description of the Elstir canvasses, in painting in his own writing the 
 Proust, Within a Budding Grove, 566-567.59
 Proust, Within a Budding Grove, 570-571.60
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reading which he has made of Elstir’s own work, has offered, albeit unwittingly, a description, 
in his own creative language, of that which will become the greatest success of a seeing through 
the window; it becomes the vehicle by which a double-seeing, and thus a double-reading, of 
the world might render itself apparent, an externalizing of the narrator’s internality coupled 
with an internalizing of the narrator’s externality—it is the foundational seeing upon which 
fixes the buttresses of Marcel’s ability to write. 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A LANGUAGE OF SEEING 
It is the same in life; the heart changes, and it is our worst sorrow; 
but we know it only through reading, through our imagination: in 
reality its alteration, like that of certain natural phenomena, is so 
gradual that, even if we are able to distinguish, successively, each of 
its different states, we are still spared the actual sensation of 
change.  61
 We’ve observed, in the previous discussion of voyeurism, the means by which the 
window enacts a disfiguring in the act of seeing which precedes and later becomes the vehicle 
for an alterity of seeing synonymous with the creative and imaginative act of art-making. Still, 
though, we might encounter a difficulty in attempting to separate the imaginative and creative 
double-seeing from the disfigurement immediately implied by the seeing through the window, 
the line between them being, as it is, thinly drawn. 
 Marcel captures Elstir’s creative process as one of ongoing neologisms: “If God the 
Father had created things by naming them,” he notes, “it was by taking away their names or 
giving them other names that Elstir created them anew. The names which designate things 
correspond invariably to an intellectual notion, alien to our true impressions, and compelling 
us to eliminate from them everything that is not in keeping that notion.”  Elstir’s neologisms 62
are not mere un-naming as unseeing; his painting, we understand, is not mere abstraction, but 
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 117.61
 Proust, Within a Budding Grove, 566.62
 36
the painstaking effort of disfiguration and reconstitution.  “By his impressionism,” Beckett 63
notes of Elstir, “I mean his non-logical statement of phenomena in the order and exactitude of 
their perception, before they have been distorted into intelligibility in order to be forced into a 
chain of cause and effect. The painter Elstir is the type of the impressionist, stating what he 
sees and not what he knows he ought to see.”  His impressionism is not one which denies a 64
foundational truth that is held in the objects of which he has painted, but one whose function 
displaces such an object and articulates the subject, the viewer, as the arbiter of meaning; and 
yet it is the artist who is finally able to transcend their own subjectivity in seeing, to reconcile 
their own projection with the world.  
 In the Proustian universe, the manner in which the object of one’s seeing is muddied 
inevitably in the act of seeing is foundational. It is in the will of the creative act which 
originates a transcendental subject-ness that reconstitutes, that is, refigures, an object-ness 
within the world; and it is this precisely which differentiates the seeings of Elstir and, later, of 
Marcel from those of Charles Swann, whose interest in art is peripheral and superficial, and 
whose seeings are of a quality which imposes itself in the disfiguration of objects toward their 
falsification. As Leo Bersani notes, “Marcel comes to consider artistic genius as the ability to 
 Elstir, as we have shown previously in quotation of Marcel’s ekphrasis in Elstir’s studio, is not an abstract painter but a 63
figurative painter; though it is never explicitly stated within the text, many have argued, sometimes crudely, as Parker 
Tyler, that Elstir “is obviously an impressionist,” in “The Impressionism of Marcel Proust,” The Kenyon Review 8, no. 1 
(1946), 49. Other prominent and likely comparisons for Elstir include Monet, Cézanne, Manet, and Whistler, whose 
name might perhaps be an anagram for that of Elstir. Raymond T. Riva notes that “one can see clearly the influences of 
Ruskin and Emile Mâle,” in “A Probable Model for Proust’s Elstir,” MLN 78, no. 3 (May 1963): 309. Later, he notes that 
Elstir is demonstrably “a composite of several painters” which have been mentioned herein (310); and, later still, he 
remits to certain documents which point toward another “very important model for Elstir[…] [being] the American 
painter Thomas Alexander Harrison” (310). Finally, he concludes, noting, “ultimately, is not Proust himself the most 
important model for Elstir” (313), which seems, given the sheer quantity of painters reasoned to have been of some 
influence upon the enigmatic character of Elstir, to be the most logical, were Elstir not the Frankenstein’s creation of all 
available impressionistic painters contemporaneous to Proust’s writing. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Elstir “is 
obviously an impressionist.”
 Beckett, Proust, 66.64
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transcribe the ‘residuum’ of individuality that we are ordinarily forced to leave unexpressed 
when we use a language designed to emphasize what men share.”  Swann’s seeing seeks to 65
enact a reconciliation of art with the world, as we will come to see, not in a transcendental 
subject-ness, but rather in a conflation of one with the other, in a misplaced double-seeing. 
 Swann, on his way to meet Odette at her house,  
Formed a picture of her in his mind[…] He had always found a peculiar 
fascination in tracing in the paintings of the old masters not merely the general 
characteristics of the people whom he encountered in his daily life, but rather 
what seems least susceptible of generalisation, the individual features of men 
and women whom he knew.  66
Such a generalization, constructed of the comparison of art to the semblance, that is, to the 
phenomena, of objects and subjects in the world, leads to a misappraisal of them both; it is to 
say that the object of one’s seeing is phenomenalized, that it ‘seems like’, and, therefore, such a 
seeing is never an adjudication of, essentially, what is. 
[Swann] no longer based his estimate of the merit of Odette’s face on the 
doubtful quality of her cheeks and the purely fleshy softness which he supposed 
would greet his lips should he ever hazard a kiss, but regarded it rather as a 
skein of beautiful, delicate lines which his eyes unravelled, following their 
curves and convolutions, relating the rhythm of the neck to the effusion of the 
hair and the droop of the eyelids, as though in a portrait of her in which her 
type was made clearly intelligible.  67
Swann’s logic of seeing qualifies a reification of otherness, an essential object-ness of things in 
stasis, to be hollowed out and projected upon; and yet, insofar as Swann’s particular seeing 
 Leo Bersani, Marcel Proust; the Fictions of Life and of Art (New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, 1965), 210.65
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 314-315. The passage continues: “as, for instance, in a bust of the Doge Loredan by Antonio 66
Rizzo, the prominent cheekbones, the slanting eyebrows, in short, a speaking likeness to his own coachman Rémi; in the 
colouring of a Ghirlandaio, the nose of M. de Palancy; in a portrait by Tintoretto, the invasion of the cheek by an 
outcrop of whisker, the broken nose, the penetrating stare, the swollen eyelids of Dr du Boulbon” (315).
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 316.67
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“enabled him[…] to introduce the image of Odette into a world of dreams and fancies[…] 
where she assumed a new and nobler form,”  the seeing feels still eerily similar to that which 68
we have hitherto described, that seeing which has been evinced by Elstir. It perhaps serves us 
well to further excavate their essential differences, to trace carefully the line which separates the 
disfigurative seeing from the refigurative, neologistic seeing. For to simply identify Swann’s 
delusion as an instance of snobbery, though it surely is, or of bad seeing, which it certainly is as 
well, would be to ignore the essential differences in the formations of these distinct visions.  69
 Swann’s peculiar insistence as to the malleability of Odette seems in itself to resist the 
stagnancy which we have hitherto posited as being inextricable from the faultiness of his 
seeing; his noting, as it were, of the “delicate lines which his eyes unravelled” and of a 
“rhythm” and “effusion” nascent in the relating of her neck and her hair, gestures towards a 
motility gathered in the movement of his eyes unravelling her image. Her ability to, under his 
gaze, assume a “new and nobler form” echoes the writing of Baudelaire on the apparatus of the 
window in the conception of the written work of art: therein, he notes, “What does it matter 
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 317.68
 Though it is largely true that Swann’s seeings might be characterized as being ‘bad seeing’, it is also worth noting that 69
there are redemptive moments within the larger narrative of Swann’s seeing. One such example, which occurs in a 
moment in which Swann, at the Marquise de Saint-Euverte’s, is placed at a distance from the social world, distracted by 
the phantasy in the image of Odette. The narrator observes the lucidity of Swann’s vision, as “the spectacle of the servants 
gave place to that of the guests[…] And in these men[…] there was nothing, down to the monocles which many of them 
wore[…] that, no longer restricted to the general connotation of a habit, the same in all of them, did not now strike him 
with a sense of individuality in each” (Proust, Swann’s Way, 463-464). The monocle, a symbol of seeing itself, presents the 
means toward an access to the essential “individuality in each” person present, such that the habitualized totalization of 
the general concept of society becomes an actual totalization of its individual parts. Marcel notes, of Swann in this 
moment, that “it was society as a whole, now that he was detached from it, which presented itself to him as a series of 
pictures” (459). Swann is again reminded of his phantasy for Odette by the playing of Vinteuil’s sonata, which presents a 
moment in which “he now recovered everything that had fixed unalterably the specific, volatile essence of that lost 
happiness; he could see it all” (491); he sees, even, in the music “ideas veiled in shadow, unknown, impenetrable to the 
human mind,” whose “form[…] could not be resolved into rational discourse” (496); and yet the stroke of lucidity in his 
seeing seems to be punctured later when he notes “an underlying sense[…] in the words” used by the Comtesse de 
Monteriender to describe the sonata, that she has “never seen anything to beat it[…]” before adding, “anything to beat 
it… since the table turning!” (501). Swann consigns this experience of seeing, as such, to the realm of the supernatural, 
treated as inexistent and to be kept within himself.
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what reality may be when placed outside my self, if it has helped me to live, to feel that I am 
and to feel that which I am?”  Implicit, then, in the malleability of the object, and in the 70
invention of her ‘story’, is that, in its artistic function, it reconciles the image of the voyeur 
with the image of that which they are seeing. Swann’s gesturing is directed not toward the 
apprehension of the self in the image of the other; it is directed, as it were, only toward the 
deluding of his self in the desire of phantasy (or in the phantasy of desire), founded and 
fictionalized in the implicit double-seeing of the world of objects with the world of art. 
 This transposition, still, mirrors to some degree the indeterminate fluidity with which 
Elstir, as we have noted, is able to confuse the delineations between the oppositional forces of 
sea and land; art being, however, not necessarily an opposition to a being-in-the-world and the 
signs held therein, but an appraisal of an essence which underlies a more spiritual conception 
of that which is essentially true and real, such a comparison doesn’t quite hold traction. “It is 
inconceivable that a piece of [art],” Marcel notes, “which gives us an emotion that we feel to be 
more exalted, more pure, more true, does not correspond to some definite spiritual reality, or 
life would be meaningless.”  Art is not, in Proust’s terms, to be taken on par with the objects 71
of the world, with what Deleuze refers to as “the world of[…] worldliness,” but art is to be 
taken rather as being of a higher order.  As Deleuze later notes, “[the essence] is a difference, 72
the absolute and ultimate Difference. Difference is what constitutes being, what makes us 
conceive being. This is why art, insofar as it manifests essences, is alone capable of giving us 
 Baudelaire, Le Spleen de Paris, 173.70
 Marcel Proust, The Captive & The Fugitive, trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff, Terence Kilmartin, and D.J. Enright, vol. 5, In 71
Search of Lost Time (New York; London: Modern Library ; Kuperard, 1999), 504.
 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 5.72
 40
what we sought in vain from life.”  The connection between art and life is thus somewhat 73
contradictory, art being in direct correspondence with the world itself, of an essence “not 
existing on the surface of the Earth,” nor “with all the more reason in what we call the world,” 
and yet, it is necessarily the purveyor of an essential truth. Marcel asks, of such a difference, of 
such an elusive essence, “Does it exist[…] anywhere? Vinteuil’s septet had seemed to tell me 
so.”   74
 Marcel’s own understanding of the concept of essence, or of an essential truth, places 
such a notion in some sort of existence that is, by its nature, oppositional to “the surface of the 
earth” or to “what we call the world.” Nevertheless, even in its contradictory nature, the notion 
of the essential truth belongs to a spiritual reality, which is to say that it exists; it is merely that 
its existence is not superficial, not on the surface of the world and, therefore, not in the objects 
of the world—that is, neither in their form nor their materiality. It is, rather, perhaps to be 
found as that which these functions of the object must necessarily convey; it is that which 
underlies the phenomenal qualities of the object of seeing, not the least of which is the name. 
For, as Marcel notices evinced in Elstir's painting, that “it was by taking away their names or 
giving them other names that Elstir created them anew,” then the neologistic function might 
serve as vehicle toward a refigurative seeing in the context of art-making. 
 Marcel’s own concern with the nature of names features prominently throughout the 
text; in Place-Names—The Name, the portion of the text which immediately follows Swann in 
Love, Marcel ruminates on the nature of the name as it might describe an object, but also, 
 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 41.73
 Proust, The Captive and The Fugitive, 368. I am, however, using Deleuze’s translation of the passage, which can be 74
found in, Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 41.
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consequently, upon the name as it might describe the place or person for which it stands. He 
notes, 
But if these names thus permanently absorbed the image I had formed of these 
towns, it was only by transforming that image, by subordinating its 
reappearance in me to their own special laws; and in consequence of this they 
made it more beautiful, but at the same time more different from anything 
that the towns of Normandy or Tuscany could in reality be, and, by increasing 
the arbitrary delights of my imagination, aggravated the disenchantment that 
was in store for me when I set out upon my travels. They magnified the idea 
that I had formed of certain places on the surface of the globe, making them 
more special and in consequence more real. I did not then represent to myself 
cities, landscapes, historical monuments, as more or less attractive pictures, cut 
out here and there of a substance that was common to them all, but looked on 
each of them as an unknown thing, different in essence from all the rest, a 
thing for which my soul thirsted and which it would profit from knowing.  75
The name, thus, seems possibly to possess the means by which is revealed to the imagination 
that which is essential, that which is imagined to be “different in essence from all the rest.” 
What also becomes clear, though, in Marcel’s discourse on the name, is a point at which the 
imagination begins to complete a process of which the naming is merely a seminal, yet 
beginning, stage. There is, then too, a largely interpretive process by which the name is made 
resonant to Marcel. For “much more individual still was the character they assumed from 
being designated by names, names that were for themselves alone, proper names such as 
people have!”  Their character, then, being one predicated primarily upon the proper name, 76
allows for the imaginative neologism that is the reconfiguration of the place around the name. 
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 550-551.75
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The name in this case is suggestive rather than descriptive or ‘symbological’ : it allows one to 77
fictionalize, to some degree, the image of the place.  
 Still, it is also impossible to overlook the process by which the imagination becomes 
capable of falsifying the image to the point of ‘disenchantment’ with the real; and yet, though 
the name, coupled with the image it provokes, fails often to describe the reality of the place 
itself, such that these images “aggravated the disenchantment that was in store for [Marcel] 
when [he] set out upon [his] travels,” they are also images which magnify the forming idea of 
an essential truth, which possibly is itself “in consequence more real” than that which is 
superficially gleaned in the visiting of the place.  78
 In the case, though, in which the symbolic and descriptive aspects of writing, of the 
names, then, which are given to describe the objects which exist in the world, whose essential 
truth might rest much deeper within the construction of language itself, Marcel raises a 
 I’m referring here to the theory that language might be ‘symbological’, reflexive in itself of sighted description. For, as 77
Georgina Kleege notes in her essays on blindness caused by macular degeneration, “the more one knows about language, 
the harder it is to find the vocabulary which does not have some root in sighted[…] experience” (Georgina Kleege, 
“Blindness and Visual Culture: An Eyewitness Account,” Journal of Visual Culture 4, no. 2 (August 1, 2005), 185.). See 
also, for more on the notion of language as being reflexive of sighted experience, the opening chapter of Martin Jay’s 
Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993).
 Marcel experiences a similar disappointment to the one “in store for him in his travels,” insomuch as the projected 78
image of the place in the imagination leads only to a disenchantment or misperception in the event in which it becomes 
actually perceptible, when, in first seeing the Duchesse de Guermantes, he is entirely incapable of recognizing her. He 
notes, “I said to myself: ‘This lady is like the Duchesse de Guermantes.’ Now the chapel from which she was following 
the service was that of Gilbert the Bad, beneath the flat tombstones of which, yellowed and bulging like cells of honey in 
a comb, rested the bones of the old Counts of Brabant; and I remembered having heard it said that this chapel was 
reserved for the Guermantes family, whenever any of its members came to attend a ceremony at Combray; hence there 
was only one woman resembling the portrait of Mme de Guermantes who on that day, the very day on which she was 
expected to come there, could conceivably be sitting in that chapel: it was she! My disappointment was immense. It arose 
from my not having borne in mind, when I thought of Mme de Guermantes, that I was picturing her to myself in the 
colours of a tapestry or a stained-glass window” (Proust, Swann’s Way, 246). As we will come to see later, the 
disfigurement of the imagination in tandem with the name is often paralleled with the image of the window, whose 
disfigurative quality we’ve already accredited.
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separate concern, a direct attack upon the ability for literature to evoke an essential truth 
underlying such worldly superficialities: 
[Vinteuil’s] music seemed to me something truer than all known books. At 
moments I thought this was due to the fact that, what we feel about life not 
being felt in the form of ideas, its literary, that is to say, intellectual expression 
describes it, explains it, analyses it, but does not recompose it as does music, in 
which the sounds seem to follow the very movement of our being, to reproduce 
that extreme inner point of our sensations which is the part that gives us that 
peculiar exhilaration which we experience from time to time and which, when 
we say, ‘What a fine day! What glorious sunshine!’ we do not in the least 
communicate to others, in whom the same sun and weather evoke quite 
different vibrations. In Vinteuil’s music, there were thus some of those visions 
which it is impossible to express and almost forbidden to contemplate, since, 
when at the moment of falling asleep we receive the caress of their unreal 
enchantment, at that very moment in which reason has already deserted us, 
our eyes seal up and before we have had time to know not only the ineffable 
but the invisible, we are asleep.  79
This passage, as it is relayed by Marcel, presents what is a devastating blow to the ability for 
writing, for the literary function, to fulfill that sacrosanct truth of which is imparted in the 
music of Vinteuil. For the communication of ideas, in the sense in which they may be both a 
“literary” or “intellectual expression,” is incapable of assuming the form by which this truth is 
actualized in its reception. The pre-intellectualized perception of the truth, as it were, is also 
presented in the painting of Elstir, Marcel notes, which seeks “to reproduce things not as he 
knew them to be but according to the optical illusions of which our first sight of them is 
composed.”  Writing, it seems to Marcel, is incapable, in the way that music and painting 80
may be, of conveying in their actual form the resonance of the essential truth as it is revealed 
to him in this particular moment. 
 Proust, The Captive and The Fugitive, 504.79
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 The revelation to the self of such a moment of lucidity, in the ongoing search for what 
might be an essential truth, occurs at “the moment of falling asleep,” that is, in “that very 
moment in which reason has already deserted us” and is incomprehensible in its brevity, since 
“before we have had time to know not only the ineffable,” that being the written truth 
underlying the name, nor “the invisible,” which corresponds to the visual truth behind the 
window, “we are asleep.” Such a moment, in the interim lasting between the closing of the eyes 
and the moment at which the eyes rest dormant and free to dream, allows for the revelatory 
moment toward essential truth.  
 This discovery thus takes place at the threshold between figurative and disfigurative 
seeings; notwithstanding that either the waking vision of the world or the visual landscape of 
the dream might offer interchangeably, depending on one’s own interpretive viewing of these 
distinct seeings, either the disfigurative or figurative seeing of which we have spoken, it is in 
the liminality which distinguishes them in which the sort of clarity of seeing necessitated by 
the nature of the essential truth might come to be. This threshold, actualized in the liminality 
between waking life and sleep, which mirrors in large part the novel’s opening pages, exists also 
then at the threshold between seeing and not seeing, between, as it were, the actual moment of 
seeing and the disfiguration caused in making it intelligible—in intellectualizing the image by 
way of conflating the perception with a corresponding idea. 
 Viktor Shklovsky’s Theory of Prose offers, in its proposition of the theory of 
‘estrangement’, what seems to be an alternative path by which the literary might excavate the 
essential truth buried either in the disfigurative seeing of the object through the window or in 
the disfigurative literary imagining of the object vis-à-vis the name. He notes, 
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After being perceived several times, objects acquire the status of “recognition.” 
An object appears before us. We know it’s there but we do not see it, and, for 
that reason, we can say nothing about it. The removal of this object from the 
sphere of automatized perception is accomplished in art by a variety of 
means.  81
Crucial to Shklovsky’s argument is the separating of the visual object from the literary object; 
and yet, the process of de-familiarization or of estrangement is, primarily, a circumvention of 
the functions by which habit assimilates the image or name to its corresponding idea, 
intellectualizes it so that it might appropriate the semblance of the familiar. In positing that 
the literary object does not due just service to the visual object it represents, Shklovsky places 
the essential truth of the object entirely in the empirical relationship of the subject-viewer to 
the object, such that meaning resides foremost within the object itself. 
 The nature of seeing through the window, of the subject to the image as it is presented 
in the context of the voyeuristic seeing, is one, as we have shown, not entirely of falsification 
but also which retains a possible reconciliation of the subject with the pre-intellectualized 
perception of the object of their seeing, as is evinced in the painting of Elstir. For insofar as the 
literary object is subject to the habitualized process of perception and recognition, then this 
may be said also of the visual object, whose figuration and disfiguration and, similarly, whose 
intellectualization and defamiliarization might operate along similar lines; it is not only true, 
then, that the epistemological problematic of the window is a problem of the sensory and of 
the perceptive, but that such a discussion might be mapped as easily upon the literary world as 
it already has been upon the world as it is visualized. It is not, then, such that the literary 
 Viktor Shklovsky, Theory of Prose, trans. Benjamin Sher, 1. ed., 2., corr. pr (Elmwood Park, Ill: Dalkey Archive Press, 81
1991), 6.
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object fails to describe the visual object, but that neither is capable of describing the essential 
truth which presents itself in our own being in the world.  
 Already, we have noted that the process of disfiguration in the act of seeing is conjoined 
with the intermingling of the linguistic, of the literary as represented by the name, in the exact 
moment of visual perception. In Search of Lost Time, in its paralleling imagery of the window 
alongside its discourse on the notion of names as they relate to objects in the world, similarly 
places such a discussion of seeing and knowing, of comprehending an essential truth of—but 
not in—the world, equally within the faculties of seeing and of literary sense-making, as well 
as in the space between them. 
 Shklovsky later articulates what such a “variety of means” might entail, as he gestures 
toward a method by which art might circumvent the automatization of perception and access 
perhaps some semblance of the essential. Preeminent within such means is the notion of 
‘estrangement’, which in other translations is also termed as a ‘defamiliarization’. Using Tolstoy 
as an example of the mastery of the theory of ‘estrangement’, Shklovsky argues,  
The devices by which Tolsto[y] estranges his material may be boiled down to the 
following: he does not call a thing by its name, that is, he describes it as if it 
were perceived for the first time, while an incident is described as if it were 
happening for the first time. In addition, he foregoes the conventional names of 
the various parts of a thing, replacing them instead with the names of the 
various parts in other thing.  82
In the severing of the linguistic object from the habitualized idea to which it correlates, 
Shklovsky represents a return to materiality, to perception in the literary sphere from the 
pretence of a literary modality which fails to capture things as they are. It is also framed as a 
 Viktor Shklovsky, Theory of Prose, 6.82
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return to the seeing of the object in its actual material formation, a return, if not to the image, 
then to the image which predates the image, that which comes before its incipient connection 
to the idea associated with the name; in doing so, it seeks to present a literary capsule for the 
experience of vision itself, that is, a visual experience which predates also our own experience 
of the visual. The name, then, might perhaps become the nullification of the power of the 
image and, likewise, a straying into a science of literature, into the basic communication of 
meaning, rather than into a poetical refiguration of the object in writing. 
 The essay begins with an unattributed quotation: “‘Art is thinking in images’”  Under 83
the Proustian model, in which the parallel drawn between the disfiguration of the image in the 
window and the disfiguration of the name, the literary impossibility by which it fails 
adequately to describe things as they are, is reconciled not in the image (nor, it seems, is the 
image reconciled in the literary) but in the recuperation of the essence which underlies them 
both, in the convalescence, as it were, from the disfigurative seeings which they seem most 
often to impart. For, Marcel notes, as “images, unreal, fixed, always alike, filling all my nights 
and days, differentiated this period of my life from those which had gone before it (and might 
easily have been confused with it by an observer who saw things only from without, that is to 
say who saw nothing),” then the image, without form or figuration, outside the context of the 
literary, might liken itself to the observation of ‘nothing’.  This is the unfortunate experience 84
of the voyeur, but it is also the experience of one whose reliance on names, and whose 
experience of the literary, might fall too far on either side of a spectrum of figuration—upon 
one for whom names mean, altogether, everything or, conversely, mean nothing at all.  
 Viktor Shklovsky, Theory of Prose, 1.83
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 555.84
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 It follows, in the developing narrative of the Search, that art cannot merely be ‘thinking 
in images’. For the image in itself is the phenomena under which is held captive an inkling of 
the essential. It is perhaps, on the other hand, in the practice of distinguishing within and 
between images, within one’s own seeing and within one’s artistic vocation, in peeling back the 
forming layers of the image to reveal its essence, that art is originated. In dealings both in 
names and in images it is, as Beckett notes, in a reorganization of habit, “an operation 
described by Proust as ‘longer and more difficult than the turning inside out of the eyelid, and 
which consists in the imposition of our own familiar soul on the terrifying soul of our 
surroundings,” that the essential is derived from the ephemeral.   85
 It is, likewise, in a refigurative process by which one accounts for their own habit that 
the habits of seeing themselves might be circumvented—in, as it were, an ability to look back 
at oneself, as “according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo).”  And so the 86
creative act, as in the interpretation of one’s own seeing, is conducted in reverse, ever a 
‘looking back at’, “as Elstir painted the sea, by reversing the real and the apparent, starting 
from illusions and beliefs which one then slowly brings into line with the truth, which is the 
manner in which Dostoievsky tells the story of a life.”  And yet, this particular act of seeing is 87
not a glamorization of the past, nor is it necessarily the admission that one is capable only of 
understanding and knowing in the past tense; it is, rather, the seeing by which we are able to 
see ourselves, the same seeing by which we are able to account for our own reflection in seeing 
through the window. 
 Beckett, Proust, 26.85
 Lyotard, Answering the Question  : What Is Postmodernism?, 81.86
 Proust, Time Regained, 431.87
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 The linearity of the figurations which have so consumed Swann in his imaginings of 
Odette, his ‘artistry’ being one which manifests “the image of Odette,” is essentially a gesture 
toward a phenomenal ‘seems-like’. Her likeness becomes only the means toward a comparison 
with another work of art. The linearity of her contour, of her face likewise, become similarly 
the phenomenal mise-en-scène for an ephemeral interaction, one which relates to art only in 
its interest in form. Her ‘type’, also, which Swann desires to have made “clearly intelligible,” 
echoes such an interest in image over an essential truth; the tupos  being, as it were, the 88
conformist undertaking by which the impression of the image is formed, then it is the image 
less of a neologism of Odette’s essential truth than of a sublimation of her image into another
—not, then, the separation of the phenomenal double-seeing so much as the conflation of one 
seeing with another seeing of a different order. Her tupos signals the extrication of her essence 
into another prison altogether, to be held captive deep within her own image now itself held 
captive within the domain of art, within the image of Botticelli’s Zipporah.   89
 The disfigurative process by which Odette’s image is captured, enabled in the 
comparison Swann engenders between her and Zipporah, is a capturing instituted by the self; 
the process of such a disfiguration is one that relies entirely on the creator of the image, thus 
the image is held at a distance from the realms of which it was taken, that is, from the realm of 
 The etymology of ‘type’, stemming from the Ancient Greek tupos, connotes a writerly quality, as in a textual content; it 88
suggests as well an ‘image’ in the form of a ‘mark’ or ‘impression’; lastly, it suggests a pattern of conformity, a habitualized 
generalization of sorts. The use of the word, ‘type’, if not a deliberate implication toward a correlation existing between 
seeing, writing, and the formation of habit, is still altogether an evocation of the habitualized writing and seeing of the 
other; the impression by which they are made intelligible or even present is heralded in the etymology of tupos. In the use 
of the term tupos, then, we are forced to acknowledge to some degree the means by which Odette is assimilated into 
Swann’s own phantasy—that she is seen, written, and impressed into a habitualized image.
 For “it was with an unusual intensity of pleasure, a pleasure destined to have a lasting effect on him, that Swann 89
remarked Odette’s resemblance to the Zipporah of that Alessandro de Mariano to whom people more willingly give his 
popular surname, Botticelli, now that it suggests not so much the actual work of the Master as that false and banal 
conception of it which has of late obtained common currency” (Proust, Swann’s Way, 316).
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art and from the realm of the world. The image, now in captive stasis, proceeds in another 
realm entirely—that of the projected. Such a vision remains at the centre of Swann’s 
relationship with Odette, but becomes merely a placeholder for a way of seeing predicated not 
upon an interrelationship with the world but, rather, within an infinitesimal means to project 
within himself. The imaginary in this case becomes the totalizing gaze which captures and 
imprisons the phantasy of Odette, whose captive image then resides within Swann under the 
guise of Zipporah.  
 Swann, in this case, also models a behaviour that is, essentially, creative, in which the 
imaginary supplants the supposed reality. Odette’s own features have been transposed entirely, 
their form lost to the image. The act of love itself, as it is presented within their relationship, 
becomes also the image of habitude, as the over-worked symbolism of the ‘cattleya’: the 
interpretation of its symbol, being that it is so distinctly separated from the act it engenders, 
involves then the ritualization of habit itself.  That the invocation of the flower is the pretence 90
for their intercourse displaces their relationship into an image; the metaphoric quality of the 
interaction is habitualized to the point at which it carries no real significance, no real memory 
of the essence by which it came originally to be. We might say the same thing about their 
 When Swann, one evening at the Verdurins, arrives to find Odette has already departed, he “ransack[s] the streets of 90
Paris” in searching for her. Eventually, when he finds her and joins her in her carriage, the cattleyas, part of Odette’s 
flowery garb, become the pretence for their flirtation: “[Odette] was holding in her hand a bunch of cattleyas, and Swann 
could see, beneath the film of lace that covered her head, more of the same flowers fastened to a swansdown plume. She 
was dressed beneath her cloak, in a flowing gown of black velvet, caught up on one side to reveal a large triangle of white 
silk skirt, and with a yoke, also of white silk, in the cleft of the low-necked bodice, in which were fastened a few more 
cattleyas” (Proust, Swann’s Way, 328-329). After the horse starts abruptly to one side, and Odette is left “quivering and 
breathless,” Swann begins to refasten the cattleyas upon the different articles of clothing on which they had been placed 
(329). Later, this will become “the ritual pretence of [Swann’s] rearrangement” of Odette’s cattleyas, such that “the 
metaphor ‘Do a cattleya,’ transmuted into a simple verb which they would employ without thinking when they wished 
to refer to the act of physical possession[…], survived to commemorate in their vocabulary the long-forgotten custom 
from which it sprang” (331).
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invocation of the Vinteuil Sonata, whose meaning is displaced into the image of Odette;  and 91
we might also say this about Swann’s voyeuristic seeing of what he imagines to be Odette at 
the window, by which the shadows of two older men are displaced into the image of Odette 
and a probable lover.  The essentially creative, and yet ultimately problematic, insistence upon 92
projection is analogous to a particular misuse of the metaphoric function within literature. The 
issue of Swann’s seeing, most importantly, lies in the habits of seeing by which he is never able 
to see the process of his own disfigurative seeing, nor, then, is he able to account for it in his 
appraisals of the world. 
 The section entitled Swann in Love ends, as it were, with Swann exclaiming to himself: 
“To think that I’ve wasted years of my life, that I’ve longed to die, that I’ve experienced my 
greatest love, for a woman who didn’t appeal to me, who wasn’t even my type!”  Swann, 93
misguided as he is, now places the locus of his love in Odette’s person, he charges her with 
being of a typos, ignoring the process by which it has been him, in his falsifying gaze, that has 
typified her character, that has appropriated her into a stagnant image even as he elevates her 
image into the realm of art; even as he disfigures the image of Odette, he is negligent to the 
effects of his own seeing, to his own complicity in such a typification. 
 Such issues of seeing predominate not only the seeings of Swann within the text, but 
also those of Marcel, whose making captive the image of Albertine mirrors largely Swann’s 
 In becoming “the national anthem of [Swann and Odette’s] love,” Vinteuil’s little phrase displaces, likewise, their love 91
into a realm of which it knows nothing, that is, the realm of art; and, consequently, it disfigures the sonata (Proust, 
Swann’s Way, 308). That which is described foremost as being a totalizing and altogether staggering work of art, is 
truncated, fragmented to the point at which it retains none of its essence save the ‘little phrase’. Odette at one points asks 
Swann, “Why do you want the rest? Our little bit; that’s all we need” (309). 
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 387.92
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 543.93
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capturing of the image of Odette; that she will become later the fugitive figures largely into 
Marcel’s reappraisal of seeing, but also imparts an important duality embodied by the image—
by which it may be both static and fleeting. In insisting towards an analogy between the image 
through the window and the function of naming, we might insist also essentially upon an 
analogy in their reconciliation, an achievement of literature, a renaming which mirrors Elstir’s 
model of a refiguration of the disfigured percept in the window.  
 Marcel, in speaking of a quality of untenability within the name of Albertine but also 
in her silhouetted image, suggests, 
I ought to give a different name to each of the selves who subsequently thought 
of Albertine; I ought still more to give a different name to each of the Albertines 
who appeared before me, never the same, like those seas—called by me simply 
and for the sake of convenience ‘the sea’—that succeeded one another and, 
against which, a nymph likewise, she was silhouetted.  94
Unwittingly, he suggests also the means by which the literary modality might effect its own 
refiguration toward the essential—not, as it were, within the estrangement or displacement of 
the image or name along spacial terms, but in the effecting of such a neologistic function in 
time, in extending the gaze beyond the disfigured layering of images in space and toward a 
succession of images, of names. “Like those seas” of Elstir, whose ongoing neologisms 
convalesce the essential truths of that which they define in time, painted, as they are, ‘in 
reverse’, and which depict the interrelation, even the interchangeability, of these seas with the 
land—the seas swallow the edges of the land such that they are in continuous exchange, such 
that their indistinctness from one another is a seeing of their relationship in movement, that is, 
over time—Marcel’s imperative is to create images in writing “that succee[d] one another and, 
 Proust, Within a Budding Grove, 720.94
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against which, a nymph likewise, [is] silhouetted” that whose material formation, as it were, 
becomes of a layering of distinct seeings in time. 
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A SEEING OF TIME 
Suddenly I stood still, unable to move, as happens when we are 
faced with a vision that appeals not to our eyes only but requires a 
deeper kind of perception and takes possession of the whole of our 
being.  95
 A seeing, in time, through the window is the becoming of Marcel’s art-making process. 
It is in the window, and in its analogy with a literary modality—with, in particular, the name
—that Marcel’s poiesis is enabled. It is, likewise, the window and the name which become both 
the vehicles of disfiguration and the reconstitutive instruments by which Marcel learns to see 
and to write anew; accordingly, it is by way of this particular creative act, by way of a poiesis, as 
it were, that Marcel might excavate the essential from the superficial, that he might find the 
essential truth which eludes him until the final moments of the texts, when he proclaims his 
ambition, “to describe men as occupying so considerable a place[…] in Time,” and assumes a 
totalizing gaze in time;  and yet, we have still not given any means toward a reconciliation of 96
such a totalizing gaze, nor the final writing of the oeuvre, with the character which we have 
thus far been describing, whose seeings at the window and whose neologisms offer promise of 
a poiesis but are still uncertain of themselves, have still yet to become the refigurative vehicles 
which we have thus far predicted them to have been. 
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 197.95
 Proust, Time Regained, 532.96
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 Marcel still doubts the ability for the literary to offer the vantage point by which the 
issue of the window is remedied, by which the phenomena is refigured to reveal the buried 
essential. He echoes his earlier doubt for the literary to embody the essence, for his writing to 
be worthy of his own isolation from the world, even as he has yet to begin writing his oeuvre 
toward the end of the text. He asks, “what point is there in foregoing the pleasures of social life 
if, as seems to be the case, the famous “work” which for so long I have been hoping every day 
to start the next day, is something I am not, or am no longer, made for and perhaps does not 
even correspond to any reality.”   97
 Neither does the essence correspond to any reality; it is, essentially, untenable. For it is 
impossible to find, nor to describe, as it rests buried within the ephemera of the world; it is the 
paradise lost, which can never be returned to, gestured toward but always out of reach, “since 
the true paradises are the paradises we have lost.”  We may run in circles around it and never 98
quite reach it, though it exists: Marcel has heard it in Vinteuil’s septet; he has seen it in Elstir’s 
painting. Still, there remains the question as to whether the literary might justify an expression 
of this essence and by what means might it express a layering of distinct seeings in time, given 
that the locus of the seeing, its essence, is irremediably lost, hinted towards necessarily in 
retrospection. 
*** 
 Proust, Time Regained, 240.97
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METAPHORIC SEEING AND INVOLUNTARY MEMORY 
 To reflect and, then, to refigure is an essential function of Marcel’s art-making. For it is 
only in the examination of one’s own seeing a posteriori in which the primeval seeing, the 
“non-logical statement of phenomena in the order and exactitude of their perception,” might 
be recovered. The convalescence of seeing, the return to the point of seeing and thus the 
interposing of one moment of vision upon another, that is, the layering of a succession of 
images, is yet analogous to the transcendental feat that is involuntary memory, which revivifies 
an image from the distant past alongside the immediate present; it is “a reduplication,” as 
Beckett notes, “at once imaginative and empirical, real without merely being actual, ideal 
without being merely abstract, the ideal real, the essential, the extratemporal.”   99
 It is the bridging of the distance at which one sees through the window, from which 
one must see, and by which one is kept always at a distance from the essence of their own 
seeing. For the seeing, as we have noted, may be investigated retrospectively, and one may 
likewise attempt to refigure the phenomenalization which occurs in the moment which 
directly follows the seeing—and, in doing so, to dispel the disfigurations which one might 
have been complicit in creating within the image—and yet there is ever the looming 
impossibility that one might never again be able to inhabit the seeing at the exact moment at 
which it was made—that is, prior to its being made intelligible, prior to its being 
 Beckett, Proust, 56.99
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phenomenalized. It is only by way of the involuntary memory that one is allowed to inhabit 
such a space of seeing. 
 Gérard Genette’s analysis of the Search, as evidenced within his essay, Metonymy in 
Proust, responds to the importance of the metaphor within the text, being, as it were, the 
vehicle of involuntary memory, in discussing the essentiality of metonymy alongside (and 
inside) the metaphor within the Proustian model. The image favoured by Proust, he notes, in 
quoting Proust’s Correspondance, is one “of transparent unity, where all things, as they lose 
their initial appearance as things, fall into place alongside each other in a type of order, imbued 
by the same light, seen within each other, without a single word remaining aloof, resistant to 
assimilation.”  Even in his suggestion that the metonymic image is, in fact, the favoured 100
image of Proust (as opposed to the metaphoric image), he positions the relationship between 
metaphor and metonymy as one made between two essential parties, but also as a distinction 
between two distinct means of seeing; they are, essentially, two contiguous and corollary 
seeings, which stem necessarily from one another, such that both enact an essential contiguity 
in which “all contrasts are wiped away, all oppositions disappear, all barriers vanish in the 
euphoria of a continuous space.”  101
 The use of metonymy within Proust, is thus explained by Genette as an extension of 
the metaphor, in which a “metaphoric relationship is established between two terms already 
linked by a relationship of spatiotemporal contiguity.”  In this sense, then, the relationship 102
 Marcel Proust, Correspondance, ed. Philip Kolb, vol. 2 (Paris: Plon, 1976), 86. The quoted section appears also, as we 100
have noted, in, Gérard Genette. “Metonymy in Proust” In Swann’s Way: The Moncrieff Translation ed. Susanna Lee, 
433-453, A Norton Critical Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014), 451. The translation is Genette’s.
 Genette, Metonymy in Proust, 442.101
 Genette, Metonymy in Proust, 451.102
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between these two modes of analogy, between metaphor and metonymy, should be seen not as 
a binary, but as a succession of seeings made manifest within the Search itself, made apparent 
only in the actual progression made by the author-narrator from metonymy toward metaphor 
(as well as between them and within them), from the microscopic toward the telescopic—a 
manifestation of an “apprenticeship in signs” of an ever-increasing scope, signs which require 
of a truth-seeker always a new vantage point, a new perspective, and thus desire a certain 
narratorial motility. The metonymic function is a subset of the metaphoric function;  it is 103
simply that it enacts the metaphoric function within a localized geography, within, as it were, a 
substitution in proximity, such that the “role of metonymy [is] within metaphor.”  Landy, 104
though claiming that “Genette and De Man are a little overzealous when they tar all of 
Marcel’s metaphors with the metonymic brush,” still terms Proust’s particular usage of their 
functions entwined as being that of the ‘metonyphor’.  105
 A narratorial motility, which is at once the most adequate response to the limits of 
seeing,  might also be well served by the use of metaphor and metonymy within a literary 106
work: metonymy, first, as a localized asset, as a comparison made based on the proximity of 
things, serves the function of moving through a defined and immediate space and simulates 
the motion of a narratorial voice and eye through said space; metaphor, as a radical 
 Genette, though, would argue that they are, in different instances, subsidiary to one another, but that, more often, it 103
is the metaphoric seeing which becomes a subset of the metonymic seeing. It is sufficient, in this case, to note merely the 
interrelatedness of their functions which, as Genette and Landy both claim, operate similarly and often in a capacity in 
which they pick up upon one another, in which they both invoke and evoke the other.
 Genette, Metonymy in Proust, 434.104
 Landy, Philosophy As Fiction, 73.105
 Since, in changing perspective and in shifting the visual plane, the simultaneity of objects with a visual field and the 106
detachability of the object from the world are inevitably compromised. The nobility of seeing, as it is proposed by Hans 
Jonas, is somewhat inverted, becomes atrophied, and permits perhaps for a new seeing.
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displacement by way of substitution, evokes in this way an interchangeability of things and, 
thus, the abandonment of the seeing eye altogether (at least insofar as we may conceive of ‘the 
seeing eye’). The metaphor, as a displacement—a radical substitution made possible by the 
imaginative and creative act—is derived from the notion of the detachability of the image 
inherent to seeing, which is “at the bottom of abstraction and therefore of all free thought.”  107
The final metaphor, then, emanates from within the closing moments of the text, in the 
nearing of death and of a final freeing of the eye. 
 If we imagine sight as primarily being the sense of logic, structure, and reality, then the 
metaphor is itself never an act of seeing in that sense but, rather, becomes an uninhibited act 
of seeing imaginatively. It is an intensely interpretive vision made possible by the literary, by 
the neologistic undertaking of the writing of Marcel's life; likewise, it is the substantiation of 
the theory that there exists a certain freedom in seeing through the window, in seeing double. 
The metaphor becomes, as it were, the instinctive literary corollary to involuntary memory. 
For it is “thanks to the metaphoric operation of memory,” writes Poulet, that “the mind has 
escaped the tyranny of time as well as of space.”   108
 It is in the metonymic seeings, geographically localized as they are and which, often to 
the disappointment of the narrator, begin to contaminate the characteristics of the object of 
one seeing in another proximate vessel, that the narrator traverses the narrative (which, 
ultimately, it is he himself who has constructed); it is within these seeings, chiefly, that he 
spends the majority of his time. The metonym becomes, in evincing an interrelationship 
 Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, 147.107
 Georges Poulet, “Proust and Human Time” In, Proust: A Collection of Critical Essays, Twentieth Century Views, René 108
Girard, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 172.
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between objects of seeing in proximity, the function of the eye as projection, the fallibility of 
the window as well as its potential reconstitution. For though it muddies what one may 
perceive in the real, it is also the genesis of the seeing of Elstir, that primeval seeing which 
comes before the seeing.  
 The metonymic movement of the narrator through the text is a bipartite suggestion: 
that, primarily, the function of vision is one that is essentially a subjective “impression” which, 
“however trivial its material may seem to be, however faint its traces, is a criterion of 
truth[…]” since it forms of the necessary intercourse of our selves with the world;  and, 109
consequently, that there is a second seeing which must come after, which must revisit the 
metonymic seeing, and in doing so must transcend the subjectivity of the seeing. It is this 
seeing by which “the observable manifestations” of the first “need to be translated and[…] to 
be read backwards and laboriously deciphered.”  It is in this way that the seeing may become 110
universal, “as art exactly reconstitutes life, around the truths to which we have attained inside 
ourselves.”  111
 This second seeing is the poetic seeing; it is the imaginative seeing, the seeing uniquely 
enabled in the process of art-making, by which the artist engages with the essential in time. A 
writer, Marcel notes, 
Can describe a scene by describing one after another the innumerable objects 
which at a given moment were present at a particular place, but truth will be 
attained by him only when he takes two different objects, states the connexion 
between them[…] and encloses them in the necessary links of a well-wrought 
style; truth—and life too—can be attained by us only when, by comparing a 
 Proust, Time Regained, 275.109
 Proust, Time Regained, 300.110
 Proust, Time Regained, 302.111
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quality common to two sensations, we succeed in extracting their common 
essence and in reuniting them with each other, liberated from the contingencies 
of time, within a metaphor.  112
And so the function of the metaphoric seeing, being the corollary of the metonymic seeing 
within the text, is one not only directed toward the tracing of memory—and, likewise, is not 
merely the literary analogue for involuntary memory—but is one that is directed ultimately 
toward the poetic gesture, toward a poiesis. It is also, insofar as it draws the connection between 
two different objects, the prefiguration of a double-seeing, of a seeing through the window, 
which, in relaying the commonalities of two distinct objects, might relay also the 
commonalities of two distinct selves, that is, of the self that sees through the window and of 
the self that is reflected and projected. 
 Marcel notices, also, a similar seeing within the paintings of Elstir, within whose work 
he discovers “a sort of metamorphosis of the objects represented, analogous to what in poetry 
we call metaphor.”  Accordingly, “the trope which seems most exactly to characterize Elstir’s 113
method in his paintings of reversing marine and contiguous terrestrial details would, in fact, 
be metonymy.”  In the language of Proust, as Landy insinuates in his usage of the term, 114
‘metonyphor’, there is not a real qualitative difference in the manner in which these seeings are 
conducted; both are being directed uniquely toward the essential truth.  It is only that the 115
metonymic seeing is primarily a seeing in space—and a manifestation of an immediate 
 Proust, Time Regained, 289-290.112
 Proust, Within a Budding Grove, 566.113
 Gerald Kamber and Richard Macksey, “‘Negative Metaphor’ and Proust’s Rhetoric of Absence,” MLN 85, no. 6 (1970): 114
858–83, 859.
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perceptual world therein—whereas the metaphoric seeing is one held primarily, as it were, in 
time.  
 The metonymic seeing bears along with it the capability for disfiguration—as in the 
window, in which the proclivity toward projection leads to a configuration of space that 
deludes the seeing self, in a localized and spatialized geography—and is, as such, overcome in a 
convalescence of seeing; the metaphor, on the other hand, is enacted as a disfiguration of time
—or, on the other hand, as a disfiguration of the self towards an alterior occupying of time—
and thus is slightly less accessible. For it presents itself not in the disfiguration of the 
metonymic seeing but, rather, in the seeing of the metonymic seeing, in the impossibility, 
then, of inhabiting that particular seeing in time after it has passed.  
 The metonymic seeing is, as it were, the metaphoric seeing of Elstir, since painting is an 
art which renders, broadly speaking, the figurations of the seen along spatial terms; and yet, in 
his painting, in the “metamorphosis of the objects represented” therein, which blur into each 
other, which are in a process of becoming and are, therefore, essentially in time, therein resides 
also the quality of the metaphor. The writing of the oeuvre becomes of such a metaphoric 
seeing and must, necessarily, in order to evoke the essential truth which is held in the primeval 
seeing. For it is in the “metaphoric operation of memory,” that one might, in writing, capture 
the seeing that Elstir has modelled, that one might excavate the essential truth that is beheld 
only as a buried fragment in the given moment, but which becomes accessible in time. 
*** 
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AN OEUVRE:  
ON LYOTARD’S ‘AESTHETIC OF THE SUBLIME’ 
 Jean-François Lyotard, writing in Discourse, Figure, posits a model for the art-maker 
that resembles, in large part, the model presented by Elstir. His definition of the artist, 
however, is limiting and exclusive; the writer, notably, is not included. He writes, 
The position of art indicates a function of the figure, which is not signified—a 
function around or even in the figure, that is, a spatial manifestation that 
linguistic space cannot incorporate without being shaken, an exteriority it 
cannot interiorize as signification. Art stands in alterity as plasticity and desire, 
a curved expanse against invariability and reason, diacritical space.  116
In positioning art, “in alterity as plasticity and desire,[…] against invariability and reason, 
diacritical space,” Lyotard suggests a model for the artist which, similarly to Elstir (and later, to 
Marcel), places itself firmly against the intellect, which forms in the “plasticity and desire” of 
the most primeval seeing. In the vein of the metonymic seeing, the position of art derives itself 
of a “spatial manifestation” and becomes therefore a space that the literary “cannot incorporate 
without being shaken,” that is illegible and impossible to write; and yet, its function, in 
becoming within a “diacritical space,” hints inevitably toward a literary function—it is only 
that its literariness is not superficial, that this quality of the work derives not from a 
signification but from a function “which is not signified.”  
 Jean-François Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon, Cultural Critique Books 116
(Minneapolis [Minn.]: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 7.
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 The essential truth becomes in this case of a plasticity, of the formal disfiguration (and 
the neologistic refiguration) of the percept to access the primeval seeing, within a “diacritical 
space.” Richard Kearney notes, on the nature of such a ‘diacritical space’, “that diacritical 
perception witnesses the birth of expression, against an unformed background, as a meaning 
which begins and re-begins, an awakening which takes the form of a figure that is prefigured 
and refigured again and again, now fore, now aft, now here, now there.”  That is, the 117
diacritical space suggests an essence which underlies the figuration, that is rendered beneath 
the figurative seeing, awakened to in constant refiguration, which is the “birth of expression, 
against an unformed background.” It is, thence, a pre-perceptual mode of seeing, unique to 
the Elstirian moment which precedes the intellectualization of the seeing, a “non-logical 
statement of phenomena in the order and exactitude of their perception.”  It is the genesis of 118
seeing itself, the ‘true paradise’ of seeing. 
 The literary perspective in the seeing of such a space is necessarily distinct; it positions 
itself, contrarily to the metonymic seeing in space as it is posited by Lyotard and Elstir, in the 
form of time. Lyotard, in writing of the position of the artist in excavating, in the plasticity of 
their practice, what we have referred to herein as the essential truth, echoes many of Marcel’s 
concerns about the capabilities for the literary to achieve such an excavation of truth and of 
essence in what is deemed to be a process largely of spatial figuration (and refiguration). 
Marcel finds also such a rendering of the excavation of the essential truth, along spatial terms 
and, likewise, emanating from a visual perspective, in the genius of Vinteuil’s music. For, “in 
 Richard Kearney, “What Is Diacritical Hermeneutics?,” Journal of Applied Hermeneutics, December 10, 2011, 7.117
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Vinteuil’s music, there were thus some of those visions which it is impossible to express and 
almost forbidden to contemplate.”   119
 The paralleling seeings of space that are rendered in the works of Elstir and Vinteuil are 
analogous in the function of the seeing, in that which that seeing seeks essentially to uncover; 
though there are discrepancies by which one might separate their seeings, they both excavate, 
by way of their formal—and distinctly spatial—figurations, that which is deemed essential. 
For, as Marcel notes,  
Just as there was a certain world, perceptible to us in those fragments scattered 
here and there, in private houses, in public galleries, which was Elstir’s world, 
the world he saw, the world in which he lived, so too the music of Vinteuil 
extended, note by note, stroke by stroke, the unknown, incalculable colourings 
of an unsuspected world, fragmented by the gaps between the different occasions 
of hearing his work performed[.]  120
Marcel renders, within the competing artistic practices of Elstir and Vinteuil, a similitude of 
sighted expressiveness. For though these seeings exist, as it were, within different modalities of 
art-making, they both enact to Marcel that which is quintessentially of the eyes. Elstir’s 
perceptual world, insofar as it is already a figuration in visualized space (since it is, after all, a 
figurative painting), is still emphasized as being “the world he saw.” Likewise, Vinteuil’s music 
is presented within a diction replete with terms reflexive of a visual experience, of an 
experience in space: his music is maintains a function by which it ‘extends’ ‘colourings’ of a 
‘world’. 
 Marcel notes, “[Vinteuil’s] music seemed to me something truer than all known books. 
At moments I thought this was due to the fact that, what we feel about life not being felt in 
 Proust, The Captive and The Fugitive, 504.119
 Proust, The Captive and The Fugitive, 339-340.120
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the form of ideas, its literary, that is to say, intellectual expression describes it, explains it, 
analyses it, but does not recompose it as does music.”  At any rate, he describes, only 121
moments later, the process by which the literary might enact its own proper excavation of the 
truth, “in memory,” only to discredit it once again, noting that “the vague sensations given by 
Vinteuil com[e] not from a memory but from an impression (like that of the steeples of 
Martinville).”  When Albertine wonders whether this might be not be replicated in 122
literature, Marcel responds “that the great men of letters have never create more than a single 
[type of ] work, or rather have never done more than refract through various media an 
identical beauty which they bring into the world.”  123
 Lyotard, writing again in an essay entitled Answering the Question: What is 
Postmodernism?, explicates and reforms his conception of how the literary might represent the 
essential truth. He accomplishes this, as it were, within the dichotomy represented by 
modernist and postmodernist artistic practice, although, in doing so, he invariably redefines 
 Proust, The Captive and The Fugitive, 504.121
 Proust, The Captive and The Fugitive, 505.122
 Proust, The Captive and The Fugitive, 505-506. The addition of ‘type of ’ is my own, intended to gesture towards the 123
context in which he is explaining this to Albertine, that is, in “thinking again of the sameness of Vinteuil’s works” (505). 
For he is not simply saying that the great writers only produce one singular work, but that they all “refract[…] an 
identical beauty” (505-506). The “sameness of Vinteuil’s works” thus refers to a common direction within a similitude of 
pieces, such that they become an oeuvre, which gestures altogether toward an essential truth. The common similitude 
present within the “great men of letters,” is a similitude, rather, in which they are all directed not toward the essential 
truth but toward the superficialities and figurations by which the truth is entombed.
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the nature of these movements and strips them largely of their historical relevance.  “Modern 124
aesthetics,” he notes,  
is an aesthetic of the sublime[…]. It allows the unpresentable to be put forward 
only as the missing contents; but the form because of its recognizable 
consistency, continues to offer to the reader or viewer matter for solace and 
pleasure. Yet these sentiments do not constitute the real sublime sentiment[…]. 
The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the 
unpresentable in presentation itself[.]  125
He uses this same dichotomy, between the capacity for these newly reframed modernisms and 
postmodernisms to present an ‘unpresentable’—respectively, either in encircling it, in 
gesturing towards it in the negative, or in presenting the ‘unpresentable’ within the actual form 
of the work, which necessitates a neologistic reformulation of the rules by which the art is 
made—to frame an opposition between the formation of the writings of Proust and of Joyce: 
The work of Proust and that of Joyce both allude to something which does not 
allow itself to be made present.[…] Proust calls for the unpresentable by means 
of a language unaltered in its syntax and vocabulary and of a writing which in 
many of its operators still belongs to the genre of novelistic narration.[…] Joyce 
allows the unpresentable to become perceptible in his writing itself, in the 
signifier. The whole range of available narrative and even stylistic operators is 
put into play without concern for the unity of the whole, and new operators are 
tried. The grammar and vocabulary of literary language are no longer accepted 
 This essay, in actuality, is much more broad in its scope than we shall be able here to convey. It traces, as it were, a 124
newly defined distinction between modernism and postmodernism through what Lyotard terms an ‘aesthetic of the 
sublime’, and thus creates a dichotomy between modernist and postmodernist writing and art-making not in the period 
or movement (as tied to history) in which they are created, but based upon their ability to represent, formally, that which 
is ‘unpresentable’, that which constitutes an ‘aesthetic of the sublime’. The relation of modernism to postmodernism, in 
this case, is one in which the modern becomes the corollary of the postmodern, since postmodern works are “not in 
principle governed by preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged according to determining judgement, by applying 
familiar categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and categories are what the work itself is looking for. The artist 
and the writer, then, are working without rules in order to formulate the rules of what will have been done” (Lyotard, 
Answering the Question  : What Is Postmodernism?, 81). It is modernist art which much accord to these newly formulated 
rules, which must gesture toward the unpresentable only as it has been already evoked within the postmodern. 
Accordingly, in his re-presentation of the sublime as an aesthetic, he also recovers the germ of the Romantic cause as an 
undertaking within the modernist and postmodernist movements, at least insofar as he has reframed them.
 Lyotard, Answering the Question  : What Is Postmodernism?, 81.125
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as a given; rather, they appear as academic forms, as rituals originating in 
piety[…] which prevent the unpresentable from being put forward.  126
In championing the writing of Joyce, insofar as it reveals an aesthetic of the sublime that is 
actualized in its formation, Lyotard has retracted the claim that the “position of art 
indicates[…] a spatial manifestation that linguistic space cannot incorporate.”  He has 127
confounded his own definition of what might be accomplished within the “diacritical space” 
of art, and upon what grounds such a space might permit itself to be accessed. 
 Joyce’s writing, he argues, conveys the ‘unpresentable’ within that which is presented, 
within a neologistic usage of language itself in which “the grammar and vocabulary of literary 
language are no longer accepted as given.” The unpresentable is unearthed therein, that is, it 
becomes of the formal quality of the work; this is, of course, the same literary modality which 
he has also suggested might not be capable of enacting such an evocation, such a rendering of 
space. By this token, Lyotard suggests that Joyce’s work is uniquely non-literary, that its genius 
is one in effecting within the literary mode what is a spatialized structure, that Joyce, to some 
degree, effects the mirroring of the metonymic seeing of Elstir. To Marcel (and, likewise, to 
Proust), whose literary ambitions are rendered along spatial terms, which gesture, as it were, 
toward an extrication of an essence beneath the figuration and toward a perspective in space, 
but whose interests are in effecting such a seeing—a seeing of an ‘aesthetic of the sublime’, a 
‘postmodern’ vision—within an essentially literary modality, Lyotard suggests that their course 
 Lyotard, Answering the Question  : What Is Postmodernism?, 80-81.126
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is one necessarily in the gesturing towards, in the allusion to, in his own language, a 
‘modernist’ seeing.  128
*** 
 Lyotard does, however, note that Proust’s “hero is no longer a character but the inner consciousness of time, and in 128
that the diegetic diachrony[…] is here [in the text] put in question because of the narrative voice” (Lyotard, Answering the 
Question : What Is Postmodernism?, 80), and, in doing so, admits that Proust upsets a “literary institution” in this 
particular subversion. His argument, more precisely, is that Proust’s writing still upholds such an institutional 
understanding of the literary in its actual use of language, that it does not, as Joyce perhaps does, subvert such 
expectations in its every formal intricacy, but that it does so perhaps only in aspects of its form—only, as it were, in the 
narrative voice. This inquiry will attempt to prove, subsequently, that such a subversion of expectations such as they 
might pertain to the narrative voice is inherently not only an issue of form, but a stylistic mechanism by which the text 
evokes, with a constancy that is distinct from the constant philosophizing within the text, the ‘unpresentable’ essential.
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AGAINST CIRCULARITY 
  
 Marcel, in the early portions of the text, describes “in the environs of Combray, two 
‘ways’ which we used to take for our walks, and they were so diametrically opposed that we 
would actually have to leave the house by a different door according to the way we had 
chosen.”  These ways are the Méséglise way—which is also referred to as ‘Swann’s way’, being 129
that it passes Swann’s estate—and the ‘Guermantes way’; they are, as Marcel notes, completely 
irreconcilable, such that “to ‘take the Guermantes way’ in order to get to Méséglise, or vice 
versa, would have seemed[…] as nonsensical a proceeding as to turn east in order to reach the 
west.”  Much later, Marcel is surprised to learn from Gilberte that the two ways are not as 130
diametrically opposed as he’d previously thought. He notes, “Gilberte said to me: ‘If you like, 
we might after all go out one afternoon and then we can go to Guermantes, taking the road by 
Méséglise, which is the nicest way,” a sentence which upset all the ideas of my childhood by 
informing me that the two ‘ways’ were not as irreconcilable as I had supposed.”  131
 Harry Slochower, in noting the opposition by which the two paths are initially framed 
in relation to their ultimate reconciliation, suggests additionally that “The Verdurin and 
Guermantes [social] circles are Proust’s projections of [the] two alternative ways.”  He is not 132
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 188.129
 Proust, Swann’s Way, 189.130
 Proust, Time Regained, 3-4.131
 Harry Slochower, “Marcel Proust: Revolt against the Tyranny of Time,” The Sewanee Review 51, no. 3 (1943): 370–81, 132
373.
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altogether wrong in noting that these two routes, viewed as irreconcilable until their 
reconciliation, prefigure perhaps to the two preeminent social circles which appear within the 
text. For in these circles too, as Slochower notes, there is a deliberately placed opposition: the 
Guermantes circle sits at the uppermost echelon of the French aristocracy, typified by a vague 
sense of cultural superiority; the Verdurin circle, rather, is of the haute bourgeoisie, whose 
membership is built of the newly and exorbitantly wealthy upper-middle class in Paris. They 
represent an opposition, at once, of the old world and the new world, of a cultural significance 
and a monetary means. There is little to no intersection between them; just as one may not 
have been able to pass easily from the Méséglise to the Guermantes way, or vice versa, neither 
can one pass easily between these social milieus.  
 These social circles, though, are also over time reconciled: nearing the end of the text, 
Marcel notes, “The Princesse de Guermantes had died and the present wife of the Prince[…] 
was the former Mme Verdurin.”  Her passage, from the one social world to the other, 133
suggests a closing of the circle, the imminent reconciliation of two ‘ways’ thought previously to 
have been incompatible; and yet, the moment of their reconciliation is registered not as the 
refiguration of a previously specious quality by which these paths, and these worlds, had been 
separated, not, then, as a fulfillment but, rather, as a profound emptiness. Marcel likens the 
name of the ‘Princesse de Guermantes’ to a role to which, always, “a flood of new Princesses de 
Guermantes” would come to play, to a succession “of different actresses playing the same 
part[…] then sinking from sight beneath the unvarying and immemorial placidity of the 
name.”  The fulfillment of this circularity is one that is essentially vacuous, that posits “one 134
 Proust, Time Regained, 387.133
 Proust, Time Regained, 389.134
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single Princesse de Guermantes, ignorant of death and indifferent to all that changes and 
wounds our mortal hearts.”  135
 Slochower, as it were, picks up on the function of circularity within the text insofar as 
he has discovered it within the social circles and within the two ways in which Combray might 
be traversed, both of which seem to be utterly irreconcilable but are, later, proven to be of a 
circular shape. For in the discovery that the Méséglise and Guermantes ways are actually 
interconnected, then one might also imagine, since they seem to depart Marcel’s house in 
Combray in separate directions, that they exist in a circular configuration relative to one 
another, that they are both part of what is a larger circle. Slochower extrapolates the circularity 
of these figurations in the spatial geometries of the text into an argument that, consequently, 
maps such a spatial circularity onto the larger formation of the text—as a circularity that exists 
not only within the social figurations at play within the text, but also within “Proust’s route” 
and, therefore, within the writing of the text.  136
 Lyotard, also, in discussing what he has defined as the modernist undertaking, which 
subsists in gesturing towards an ‘unpresentable’ that resists presentation, but which cannot 
actualize it within the form of the work, describes a circular function. The allusive quality of 
such a modernism, the tainting quality by which they must always gesture to that which they 
are unable fully to represent, prefigures, then, an encircling by which they present the essential 
truth. The ‘aesthetic of the sublime’ exists within these works but only in allusion, only insofar 
as these works are able to encircle that which is ‘unpresentable’ and to point toward it in the 
negative—to uncover, as it were, the spaces around them until they are all that is left hidden. 
 Proust, Time Regained, 389.135
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Their form, in this case, is merely a suggestion, a contouring, the shape that seems most likely 
to fit therein. As in the specious reconciliation of the two ‘ways’, of the Méséglise and the 
Guermantes, the circular is a gesture toward the emptiness that lies at its core. Lyotard, in 
categorizing Proust within such a literary modality, categorically denies the means by which 
Marcel might uncover an essential truth; he denounces, on those terms, the ability for the 
literary to evoke the ‘unpresentable’ in time rather than in space. 
 This circularity, though, gestures towards what is perhaps a fundamental emptiness 
made manifest in the wreckage of time itself, that is left, inevitably, in the wake of changes of 
such seismic proportions. For time enacts its own duality: in its ongoing movement, its 
pressing ever forward, it slowly saps the life from those still living and, from those already 
dead, peels the skin from their bones; and in that which is effectively its circular function, by 
which the Duchesse de Guermantes is enabled to succeed herself, to appear as though skirting 
death, time compounds only the emptiness inherent to the vacuousness of these circles. The 
circular function becomes, thus, the means towards actualizing these dichotomous effects of 
time, which, one alongside the other, wreak themselves upon the characters of the Proustian 
world.  
 If it were in such a circular pattern that the involuntary memory made itself present, by 
which the essential truth—at once the subject of art and its direct consequence—were 
represented, then these conceptions would be replete only with such an emptiness, a gesture, 
per Lyotard, to an aesthetic of the sublime. The circular function, insofar as it is made present 
within the text’s peculiar circularities, seeks only to enact the disintegrative faculties of time 
itself. The possibility for one to regain time, rather, is enabled in a metaphoric seeing that 
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becomes of, and is prefigured by, a seeing through the window, that refigures, as it were, a 
formal plasticity of time as its immediate art-object and thereby permits access to the primeval 
seeing that is otherwise spatialized.  
 Marcel, in first explaining the dichotomy that is presented in the arrangement of the 
two ‘ways’, notes that the Méséglise way was to him “something as inaccessible as the 
horizon.”  The Guermantes way, “on the other hand, meant no more than the ultimate goal, 137
ideal rather than real.”  That which is presented here, which is intended to suggest the degree 138
to which these paths are inaccessible to the other, signifies on the other hand an entirely 
different relationship between them: it is not so much that they are inaccessible to one another 
but that they are each, and together, unrealizable to the narrator, that they are essentially 
unpresentable; and yet, their processes correspond to those which we have already defined in 
relation to metonymic and metaphoric seeings: the ‘inaccessibility of the horizon’ is shattered 
within the metonymic seeing as evinced by Elstir, such that, “beyond the sea,[…] another sea 
began, roseate with the light of the setting sun, which was in fact the sky,” such that the 
horizon is rendered indistinguishable and, thus, inconsequential;  the realization of the ‘ideal 139
rather than the real’ becomes of the metaphoric seeing, by which the immediate primeval 
seeing of space is rendered in the bridging of time.  
 These seeings enact simultaneous, yet distinct, functions toward the uncovering of the 
essential truth: the metonymic seeing manifests a spatial refiguration of time, whereas the 
metaphoric seeing manifests a temporal refiguration of space. It is this double-seeing, especially 
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insofar as it is prefigured in seeing through the window, that enacts itself in the manner in 
which the circularity cannot; and it is, consequently, this double-seeing that is actualized in the 
formation of the text, that is rendered even within its form and which does not merely encircle 
the nature of the essential truth in the practice of art-making so as to define it in the negative, 
but evokes it in its very formation. 
*** 
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DOUBLE-SEEINGS 
 So now we recognize her. She is the “someone else” we 
meant when we said, death always happens to someone else. 
And that someone else is here, as, somehow, we are not. This is 
a truth of our present lives, not only of our future deaths. You 
could even say that it is the truth of life, the truth from which 
we are exiled when the storyline yanked us into the afterlife we 
make for ourselves with words. 
 If the truth of life is that we are already dead, this is not 
really a paradox. For death is not a departure; it is merely 
resuming one’s place in being. In truth we never left it. Our 
own bodies come into their own in death, but already enjoy in 
life the most intimate relations with that material world from 
which we are barred, relations which they maintain unbroken 
in death. And so we are, in a manner of speaking, already 
corpses, haunted by ghosts.  140
 The theory of the self within In Search of Lost Time, insofar as it is evidenced in Marcel’s 
own thinking about what is, at once, simultaneously an ‘intermittence’ of the self as well as a 
constancy around certain aspects of its composition, becomes also, to some degree, of the 
seeing at the window. For as the window presents the possibility by which one might envision 
themselves as distinctly othered from their self—that is, in the reflection in the window of the 
seeing self alongside the actual object of their seeing—then too might the self be enacted 
within such a doubled variegation.  
 Shelley Jackson, “The Shelley Jackson Vocational School” In, Ways of Re-Thinking Literature, Tom Bishop and Donatien 140
Grau, eds. (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), 170.
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 Joshua Landy, in writing of the nature of the self and of self-creation in the text, defines 
such a bipartite makeup of the textual self as being between iterations of the self that are 
manifested in time either synchronically or diachronically: the synchronic division of the self is 
suggested by “a third agency [apart from the intuitive faculty and the intellect, that] always 
accompanies the other two, but silently, surreptitiously,” and which is represented by the will, 
by Marcel’s volonté, which remains a semblance of constancy as opposed to the fleeting nature 
of the diachronic self;  the diachronic division of the self is suggested by its intermittence, by 141
a successive subdivision of the self, as “in a composite mass, the elements may one by one, 
without or noticing it, be replaced by others, which others again eliminate, until in the end a 
change has been brought about which it would be impossible to conceive if we were a single 
person.”  142
 Landy later notes, upon the existence of the synchronic division of the self as it is 
represented by the faculty of the will, that “there must surely be a secret site of constancy after 
all in the ‘mind of man’, a part of ourself which can never be seen since it is always doing the 
seeing, something through which, and never at which, we stare.”  In doing so, he places the 143
 Landy, Philosophy as Fiction, 104. The existence of the will, insofar as it is the suggestion of a constancy of the self, but 141
also insofar as it might enact itself alongside (and may often, even, subsume) the more transient functions of the self—
those being the intellect and the intuition—is suggested within the text as Marcel contemplates a looming decision, and 
which Landy also quotes. Marcel notes, “My brain [intellect] assessed this pleasure at a very low value now that it was 
assured. But, inside, my will [volonté] did not for a moment share this illusion, that will which is the persevering and 
unalterable servant of our successive personalities; hidden away in the shadow, despised, downtrodden, untiringly 
faithful, toiling incessantly, and with no thought for the variability of the self, to ensure that the self may never lack what 
is needed.[…] It is as invariable as the intelligence and the sensibility [intuition] are fickle, but since it is silent, gives no 
account of its actions, it seems almost non-existent; it is by its dogged determination that the other constituent parts of 
our personality are led, but without seeing it, whereas they distinguish clearly all their own uncertainties. So my 
intelligence and my sensibility began a discussion as to the real value of the pleasure that were would be in knowing 
Albertine.[…] But my will would not let the hour pass at which I must start, and it was Elstir’s address that it called out 
to the driver” (Proust, Within a Budding Grove, 614-615).
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synchronic division of the self within a vocabulary of seeing, such that the self that wills, 
which exhibits in its character a constancy, is the same self that is “always doing the seeing.” It 
is the self “through which, and never at which, we stare.”  
 It is a self, then, which enacts a seeing at the window which predates even the 
voyeuristic seeing. For while the voyeuristic seeing, enabled through the window, enacts a 
disfiguration by way of the intellect and intuition, a process that is both conscious and 
unconscious and that is, chiefly, a product of habitualized ways of seeing—which contains also 
the potential for the refiguration of such a seeing—it is the seeing of the self in the act of 
seeing that is the final position of the narrator at the window, shuttered as he is within his own 
domicile—at the window, as it were, to his own self. The reflection in the window to the final 
narrator, the actualized expression of the will—being that he has finally and ultimately 
committed himself to that which is, and has always been, his singular ambition, the oeuvre—
becomes thereby of the seeing of the diachronic self, of the seeing of the narrator in motion 
from a position of fixed vantage but of metaphoric possibility. 
 This is, naturally, the essence of the relation between the final narrator, typified at once 
by his totalizing gaze and his disembodied eye, the narrator, as it were, that sees, in relation to 
the narrator in motion, groping and stumbling through the text, for whom the search for the 
final narrator elicits an ongoing bettering of the apparatus of seeing—that is, in the 
disfigurative and refigurative process as well as in the understanding of the seeing through the 
window. The distinction, herein, between these dual narrators, between these dual selves, 
between these dual seeings, exist, in their figurations of the essential truth, as the microscope is 
to the telescope—that is, as the metonymic seeing is to the metaphoric seeing, in which both 
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are equally important. For “it was with a telescope”, as Marcel notes, “I had used to observe 
things which were indeed very small to the naked eye, but only because they were situated at a 
great distance, and which were each one of them in itself a world.”  And yet, it is only by the 144
function of the metonymic seeing that such a metaphoric vision is made possible. It is such 
that, as Genette notes, “while the initial ‘drop’ of involuntary memory is indeed metaphoric in 
nature, the ‘edifice of memory’ is entirely metonymic.”  145
 Proust engages a metaphoric seeing, a substitution by way of the imagination, a 
disfiguration of the body in the service of occupying time. The narrator of the end of the 
Search, whose commentary, ever a reminder of De Chateaubriand’s Memoirs from Beyond the 
Grave, guides the text intermittently, alongside that of the discrete voice of the present 
narrator, from a space that is beyond time itself, is not governed by either of these spatial and 
temporal limitations; his perspective is timeless and unplaceable, his object of truth is time 
itself. The final narrator embraces a double-seeing in which, even as he perhaps stands looking 
toward his own mortality, is also a seeing directed toward his own birth, an autofictional seeing 
of one’s self in the chiasma of one’s own life; it is a seeing not toward death, but 
quintessentially a seeing from a point of perspective toward a distant terminus and, by way of 
an autofictional apparatus, a seeing also from the point of terminus toward the initial point of 
the seeing’s inception; it is, thus, a passing in both directions, as in the dichotomy of the two 
‘ways’, a double-seeing. 
 The passing of the seeing in both directions, which, as it were, serves to reunite these 
two distinct narratorial forces, is literalized within a mirroring in the opening and closing 
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moments of the text. Marcel, once beginning finally to construct that which will become his 
oeuvre, notes, “I fell back exhausted and closed my eyes[…] But I was resolved to devote to 
[the oeuvre] all my strength, which ebbed, as it seemed, reluctantly and as though to leave me 
time to complete the periphery of my walls and close ‘the funeral gate.”  Earlier, in being 146
denied the bedtime kiss by his mother, he similarly notes, “And so I must set forth without 
viaticum[…]. Once in my room I had to stop every loophole, to close the shutters, to dig my 
own grave as I turned down the bed-clothes, to wrap myself in the shroud of my nightshirt. 
But before burying myself in the iron bed,[…] I was stirred to revolt, and attempted the 
desperate stratagem of a condemned prisoner.”  They are juxtaposed, are interrelated, in that 147
the final narrator, on the verge of death, passes into sleep, whereas the earlier narrator, on the 
verge of sleep, imagines it as if it were his own death, such that it is, distinctly, a seeing of one 
another across the span of the text. 
 The duality by which the narrative voice is presented within the text is, in this way, in a 
state of constant reconciliation: the two iterations of the narrator are in constant movement 
towards one another, are placed (both implicitly and explicitly) in relation to one another, such 
that the “I, who was not yet detached from life,” the eye that gropes blindly for truth and 
which sees metonymically, is interrelated in the formation of even this particular utterance 
with the final narrator, by which point the summation of the metonymic seeings has precluded 
that which is the metaphoric seeing.  The final I, which has completed around himself “the 148
periphery of [his] walls and close[d] the ‘funeral gate,” the I that has mastered the metaphoric 
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seeing, that is able to formalize, in the writing of his oeuvre, a temporal refiguration of space, is 
then able to inhabit the actual moment of perception as it pertains to the first narrator—to 
see, in the window, alongside the first narrator and to see, in their self othered, the summation 
of their own disfigurative seeings.   149
 In this way, that which Genette describes as the “initial ‘drop’ of involuntary memory” 
takes on a function of vital importance, a function that is present, as a temporal refiguration of 
space, within the actual form of the text, and which is gestured towards most clearly, perhaps, 
in the invocation of the “I, who was not yet detached from life.”  It is this ‘drop’, as it were, 150
which refigures the primeval seeing that has become so quickly disfigured, which places these 
dual narrators in formal conjunction, together at the window, as a self seeing, and writing, 
their own self, that is, seeing double toward an essential truth—in a seeing directed toward the 
hermeneutics by which the world is read and, subsequently, toward the genesis of seeing itself. 
Marcel notes, 
As for the truths which the intellectual faculty—even that of the greatest minds
—gathers in the open, the truths that lie in its path in full daylight, their value 
may be very great, but they are like drawings with a hard outline and no 
perspective; they have no depth because no depths have had to be traversed in 
order to reach them, because they have not been re-created.  151
The essential truth lies, then, not within the seeing itself, but in its recreation, within a seeing 
double by which the depth and complexity of the interaction between the self and the world are 
seen again in metaphor, and such that the window enacts itself as the symbolic image of the self 
seeing itself in their formal refigurations of the world—that is, in their oeuvre. Seeing double, 
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from two points of perspective, as it were, becomes the means towards perceiving the depths at 
which the essential truth is buried and the mechanism by which, in the primeval seeings, such 
a truth might be uncovered. 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